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Kierkegaard as a religious genius is un-readable, and point 
out what Kierkegaard is attempting to do, So often, Kier­
kegaard is regarded the father (in wedlock or out) of existen­
tialism and as such considered to be fantastically difficult. 
I am now convinced that the truth of the matter rests rather 
in the fact that Christianity is so non-existent in our cul­
ture that any Christian would be difficult to understand. 
Admittedly, Kierkegaard as a Christian felt it necessary to 
point out, with all the subjective manipulations necessary, 
the weaknesses of any logical system of living that precludes 
the infinite. But this is simply for those who need such an 
investigation in order to be indirectly confronted with the 
possibility of religion, The pseudonymous authors demand 
as much tedious reading as one can endure; until one is fin­
ally exhausted outside the category of the infinite. The 
simplicity of the Edifying ^Discourses does not, however, de­
mand such subjective endurance.
My intention is to let both the Kierkegaard of the 
pseudonymous literature and the Kierkegaard of the Edifying
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The resulting insights of this paper could be summarised 
in these sentences:
1. Kierkegaard is from beginning to end a religious 
author.
2. A proper rendering of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous 
means of communication demands an understanding 
of Socratic irony.
3. The secret of understanding Kierkegaard's aesthetic 
authorship lies in the comparison of the pseudonymous 
literature and the Edifying Discourses.
4. For Kierkegaard the passion of the believer is con­
cerned not with time, place or state of being but 
with the infinite. Time, place and state of being 
serve to strengthen the inner man.•
5. The believer has overcome the future, the non-be­
liever is its slave.
6. If repetition is not possible religion is simply an 
adjunct to philosophy.
7. The reality of conversion for Kierkegaard consists 
of orthodox Christianity which is the only real sub­
stitute for modern doubt.
iv
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PREFACE
The nature of Kierkegaard1s authorship demands special 
care. To quote the author of the Edifying Discourses and 
then to quote one of the pseudonymous authors as if there is 
no distinction is to destroy the delicate balance and earnest 
purpose of Kierkegaard's overall genius. In order to respect 
the entire production, I have chosen to distinguish the var­
ious writers within Kierkegaard's authorship. When the name 
Kierkegaard is used, I will be referring to that man who is the
1
author of an MA thesis, the author of several pseudonymous works, 
and the author of the Edifying Discourses. When the name Sj^ren 
Kierkegaard is used I will be referring to that man of faith 
who is the author of the Edifying Discourses. When I use the 
title Magister Kierkegaard I will be referring to the writer 
of the MA thesis entitled The Concept of Irony. And when a 
particular pseudonymous name is used, I will be referring to 
that specific pseudonymous personality. If no such distiniction 
is made a critical appraisal is impossible and the sharpness 
of Kierkegaard's genius is melted down into the ambiguity of 
mediocre generality.
In one way, the entire purpose of this paper is to let 
the authorship of Kierkegaard be what it is. The confusion
1 The works are: Either/Or, Pear and Trembling, Reoetition
and Johannes Climacus or, Se Omnibus Dubit.ar.curr. r,
vi
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surrounding Kierkegaard's appeal and the tiresome adjective 
of existential attributed so often to him makes it evident 
that some distinction must be made somewhere. Kierkegaard 
himself witnessed a radical distinction in his own division 
of authorship. Specifying this division as a means of re­
vealing Kierkegaard's purpose is my intention. Once the 
apologetic nature of Kierkegaard's task is made central, undue 
concern for Kierkegaard1s duplicity of authorship is set by 
the wayside and Kierkegaard can get on with his God-given task 
of re-introducing Christianity into Christendom.
vii
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An Initial Look at 
Kierkegaard 1s Poetic Structure
Chapter 1. Hermeneutics
Bither/Or: A Fragment of Life edited by Victor Eremita in
two volumes was published February 20, lS43« Less than three 
months later on May 16, 1843 Two Edifying Discourses signed 
S^ren Kierkegaard was published. Repetition; An Essay in 
Experimental Psychology written by Constantine Constantius and 
Fear and Trembling; A Dialectical Lyric written by Johannes 
de Silentio were published on October 16, 1843. On that same 
day in 1843 Three Edifying Discourses signed Sjdren Kierkegaard 
was published.
Comparing this duplicity of publication, in order to dis­
cern Kierkegaard’s authentication of the problem "how one is 
to become a Christian" constitutes the matter of this essay.
Or, in other words, the question being asked here is: "In what
sense does there exist an apologetic in Kierkegaard’s initial 
aesthetic authorship?" The precise interest of the undertaking 
arises from the fact that Kierkegaard considered himself to be, 
from beginning to end, a religious author. By its very defin­
ition within Kierkegaard’s vocabulary, religion refers to some­
thing other than philosophy, psychology, sociology, poetry, 
history, music, ethics or humanism. Understanding religion in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
this manner, Kierkegaard is open to the possibility of traditional 
apologetics.^
Kierkegaard’s genius is directed toward a single goal, though 
it expresses itself in two distinct ways. This is made evident 
by the split publications of the pseudonymous literature and the 
Edifying Discourses. Each word used by the pseudonymous surro­
gates is tinderstood in relation to German culture. The same word 
used by Sjs/ren Kierkegaard is understood in the context of Christian 
tradition which receives its -wisdom from God and not the nearest 
culture, be it grand or insignificant.
Translation of these words from the Danish into English 
(or any other language) has the responsibility of first of all 
being understood in the context of the Danish word itself. If 
the Danish word is to be interpreted solely within the framework 
of German culture (Hegel and Goethe) then it loses the context 
of Kierkegaard's poetic. Kierkegaard's Danish vocabulary like 
that of Dante's Italian is at work establishing Christianity 
within a linguistic framework. (This is the job of apologetics.) 
Kierkegaard states that he is witnessing the reintroduction of 
Christianity into Christendom. He does this by abandoning all 
German-Homantic overtones in vocabulary and by re-establishing 
the meanings of words in strict accord to the one Christian 
tradition. For Kierkegaard Christianity is only one thing and
1 Traditional apologetics is understood in the words of 
Peter and John; "So they called them and charged them not to 
speak or teach at all in the name of Jesus, But Peter and John 
answered them, ’Whether it is right in the sight of God to listen 
to you rather than to God, you must judge: for we cannot but 
speak of what we have seen and heard.5" Acts 4:3.5-20,
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not something else. If the words used by a culture destroy this
one meaning of Christianity they must be overcome (this again,
is the precise job of apologetics ), not by mediating them back
2
into Christianity as if such a process is possible but by total­
ly rejecting their initial assumptions. It is one thing to 
mediate and mediate and mediate the dialectics of a system of 
logic with the impossible hope of establishing a proper place 
for religion (which is anything more than logical) and another 
thing to edify within a Christian apologetic in hope of witnes­
sing an already existent Christian Tradition. For a Christian 
apologetics to be possible a one-ness with Christian Tradition 
is demanded. Otherwise the apologetics does not find its mean­
ing and strength in the heart of Christianity but somewhere else. 
(Such as in religious customs, new churches, national identies, 
humanism, agnosticism, pluralism, or personal feelings.)
Kierkegaard accomplishes a Christian apologetic positively 
in the Edifying Discourses where he establishes contemporary 
words in their relationship to Christian Tradition; and when 
he coins new words which have their basis in something other 
than historical German Romanticism. (One such word is "repeti­
tion.") In the pseudonjnnous literature he accomplishes this 
negatively by showing the interesting weaknesses of the finite- 
bound Germanic vocabulary, left floating about in the subjective
2 As if the breeding of 10,000 chickens would finally 
produce a German short-hair pointer. I have known some people 
who think such a process is possible because the pointer 
happened to like chickens.
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4ambiguity of a "Christendom."
The apologetic nature of Kierkegaard's initial authorship
is not concerned with leading one by argument directly into
Christianity. Nor is it concerned with rejecting all serious
use of language for religious expression. It is neither an
authoritarian mandate, nor a holier-than-thou nominalism.
What James Collins says about Kierkegaard's aesthetic
stage of authorship is partially true:
But it must be remembered that this religious 
reason behind the use of the pseudonym 
neither dominant nor incisive, when the aes­
thetic project was started.
Yet Kierkegaard's insights unfcld in such comprehensive and 
dialectical flashes that to say that the "religious reason was 
neither dominant nor incisive" is to put an order into Kierke­
gaard's authorship which is itself neither dominant nor incisive 
at this stage in the authorship. A proper rendering of the 
aesthetic stage of Kierkegaard's writing requires neither an 
ordering nor a re-ordering but rather an aesthetical testimony.^- 
Several categorical determinants have been imposed on 
Kierkegaard's authorship in order to better understand it. Pew 
help. Plot is absent and the criss-cross of dialectics does not 
respond to the facile hand of form criticism. It is precisely
3 James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago, 1953), 
p. 42.
4 In a similar fashion you would not be witnessing the 
intended aesthetical beauty of E Vinci's "Last Supper" if you 
subjected your analysis simply to its mathematical exactness.
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5the matter of form that Kierkegaard is seeking to put back into 
its place. Or as editor Victor Eremita puts it:
These papers (of authors A and B) have afforded me
an insight into the lives of two men, which has
confirmedf-my hunch that the external is not the
internal.
Taking the cue from Kierkegaard, Collins presents the four 
stages in Kierkegaard's thought as: aesthetical, ethical,
religion A (Immanent), and religion B (Transcendent). These 
stages were derived from Kierkegaard himself, but of themselves 
they could impose an cverly-philosophical and misleading process
of development on his authorship. Taken as a whole I am not
convinced that Collins, at this point, escapes his own philo­
sophical tendency to restructure or structure improperly the 
legitimate aesthetic present in Kierkegaard's poetic produc­
tivity.
Kierkegaard sums up the whole of his aesthetic work in 
five statements:
1. That "Christendom" is a prodigious illusion.
2. That if real success is to attend the effort
to bring man to a definite position, one must
first of all take pains to find Him where he
is and begin there.
3. The illusion that religion and Christianity 
are something one first has recourse to when 
one grows older.
4. That even if a man will not follow where one 
endeavours to lead him, one thing it is still 
possible to do for him— compel him to take 
notice.
5. That the whole of the aesthetic work, viewed 
in relation to the work as a whole is a de­
ception— -understanding this word, however in a
5 Spren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Volume I, Translated by 
David F. Swenson ana Lillian Marvin Swenson with revisions and 
a foreword by Howard A. Johnson (Garden City, 1953), p.4.
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special sense, (,,,One can deceive a person 
for the truth’s sake, and, to recall old 
Socrates, one can deceive a person into the 
truth.)D
r~i
These later observations1 of Kierkegaard are helpful in retro­
spect and make it evident that Kierkegaard has a decisive pur­
pose in his aesthetic authorship. They should not, however, 
distract the reader from the diverse and dialectical character 
of his writings which took by storm the cultured Hegelians.
The means of communication employed by Kierkegaard in the 
pseudonymous half of the aesthetic composition is indirect.
Just as Socrates uses indirect communication in a situation 
where vain conceit has first to be disposed of, Kierkegaard 
uses indirect communication in a situation where the vain con­
ceit of Christendom had to be disposed of before one was able 
to talk of Christianity.
For Socrates the proper job of philosophy was to strip
away all idle words and let the truth stand as it is. Often,
to reach the heart of an argument, it was necessary for Socrates 
to blow into full scale the deceit which others held as the 
truth. It was not until those deceived finally saw to what 
their assumptions led that they were whiling to admit of their 
confusion. This cutting away of all straw thought led Socrates 
to the absolute negative, which was, moreover, that with which
6 Spren Kierkegaard, The Point of View of My Work as an 
Author, translated with introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie 
Thew York, 1962), op. 22-33.
7 The Point of View of My Work as an Author was written
by Kierkegaard in Ibko and not published until four years 
after his death.
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7lie started. For Kierkegaard, Socrates'weakness was that he 
could get no further than the absolute negative or irony. And 
yet, this was also his strength, in that it enabled him to see 
clearly where the problem did not lie. This much of Socrates 
Kierkegaard regarded as most enlightening and really superior 
to that category of negativity in Hegel which was regarded as 
a result and so as having some type of logical necessity. 
Kierkegaard was convinced that by means of irony Socrates had 
held at bay the ready wolf of idealism. Hegel was far less 
fortunate.
The pseudonymous authors parallel Socrates' agitators.
The author of the Edifying Discourses states Socrates' reply. 
Just as in the plays of Plato, the agitators of Socrates are 
generally self-defeating, so with the pseudonymous writers.
Of themselves these multifarious proteges only expose their 
growing weaknesses.
The power of the pseudonymous combatants consists in 
their ironic use of the Hegelian framework. Whereas Hegel 
used the dialectic to mediate further, the pseudonymous per­
sonalities use irony to allow the dialectic to destroy itself.
By using the absolute negative, which is the meaning of Socratic 
irony, the pseudonymous writers attempt to come to grips with 
life. The intriguing method of Kierkegaard finds him granting 
the pseudonymous muses just enough Socratic irony to make 
Hegelian philosophy appear ridiculous and yet not so much as to 
suggest that Socratic irony is in any positive way sufficient 
for man to break through to existence. This is the reason that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cso often the reader of Either/Or finds Authors A and 3 so en­
lightening in destroying the shallow beauty of romanticism and 
yet so distracting in leaving the reader nothing else*
The Edifying Discourses can be read apart from any consider­
ation of the pseudonymous literature. (Just as, in a way, mon- 
asticism can stand as a witness of God quite apart from the rest 
of the Middle Age society.) The pseudonymous literature on the 
other hand has no real independent existence, and of itself, 
leaves the reader juggling immediacy and reflection. Once the 
direct communication of the Edifying Discourses is revealed 
the ironic lack of positive expression found in the pseudonymous 
literature is radically overcome.
There remains one important difference in comparing Socrates 
and the author of the Edifying Discourses. Socrates used irony 
to keep realitjr open to the possibility of understanding by 
means of absolute negativity. S^ren Kierkegaard used irony to 
enable reality to be understood by means of the ''religious."
This is the precise moment of Kierkegaard's apologetic. Had 
Kierkegaard only produced the pseudonymous literature, only 
negatively would he have witnessed religion or the spirit of 
Christianity. With the publication of the Edifying Discourses 
the absolute nothingness of Socratic irony is radically overcome
O
from without. Religion positively introduced into the world 
by Christianity provided both a question and an answer that the
8 "Of myself I can 
and my judgement is just 
the will of him who sent
do nothing. As I hear, I judge, 
because I seek not my own will, out 
me,i! John 5 130
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Greeks on their own could not have appropriated.
To begin with, Kierkegaard respected the thought of
•Socrates for its openness to the possibility of the infinite,
and therefore to religion and more specifically, Christianity.
Nevertheless, Greek thought was quite unable to complete itself
due to its lack of the ’’principle of spirit” which was intro-
q
duced into the world with Christianity. In Kierkegaard’s 
thought this negative possibility of religion present in 
Socrates was quite a different thing than the systematic medi­
ated religion present in the philosophy of Hegel. This later 
made religion and therefore Christianity an impossibility. How 
Hegelian philosophy ruled out the possibility of Christianity 
is a constant theme in Kierkegaard's authorship. Since Hegel 
regarded religion as something mediated within his system, the 
mystery of God lost its infinity and became the un-mysterious 
subject of finite investigation.
S/ren Kierkegaard's effort was directed at leaving a door 
open to the infinite. The exhaustive categories of Hegel were 
splendid skeletons for a systematizing of the idea, but no 
where in this system of thought was there room for anything but 
the logical. Bound to the finite, as a logical necessity, free­
dom was impossible for the individual. With freedom an
9 Author A discusses this ’’principle of spirit” introduced 
by Christianity in Vol. 1 of Either/Or: ”As principle, as power,
as a self-contained system, sensuousness was first posited by
Christianityj to add still another qualification, which will, 
perhaps, show more emphatically what I mean: as a determinant
of spirit, sensuousness was first posited by Christianity.
This Is quite natural, for Christianity is spirit, and spirit 
is the positive principle which Christianity has brought into 
the world.” (Either/Or, Vol. 1, pp.59-60}
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impossibility, religion cannot exist. Either the individual 
in light of the crowd can side with the system and so be chained 
by the logical necessity of thought or the individual can, in 
light of the eternal, side with existence which in its natural 
depth is open to the infinite. There can be no compromising 
alternative. Any mediation of these two positions simply is a 
restatement of the first.
The whole aesthetic literature is more at pains to show why 
the German romantic conceptualisations of reality are unable to 
ask the religious question (or to get even as far as Socrates) 
than offer a Christian answer. Kierkegaard's task at this stage 
is to point man back to reality. If Kierkegaard was to accept 
either the Hegelian system of thought or a local variety of 
Hegelianized Christianity, he knew that historical Christianity 
would be impossible. Using the Hegelian vocabulary, Kierkegaard 
edifies his readers by re-establishing this vocabulary within 
historical Christianity. He accomplishes this on the one hand 
by allowing the pseudonymous high priests to present the roman­
tic personality as dialectically mediated, and on the other by 
allowing the author of the Edifying Discourses to edify the be­
liever. The pseudonymous muses write for the cultural sieves 
who refuse to listen to anything which does not rest busily with­
in the meshes of its own thinking.
The method of Kierkegaard's authorship takes the ideas of 
Hegelian philosophy, turns them into personalities, and lets 
them be what they can. As consistent characters reflected 
through experimental psychology and as immediate dispositions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
thought of categorically, these pseudonymous appurtenances were 
to he initially and finally self-destructive. The pseudonymous 
authors cannot break through to existence. Bound from beginning 
to end to the static poll of idealism and romanticism these 
writers are closed to the possibility of religion. As tempera­
ments sealed off to the religious, and so from the infinite, 
these characterizations are to be developed (later in Kierke­
gaard's authorship) into the categories of despair and sin.
Although religion and Christianity are spoken of explicitly 
within the aesthetic literature, it is obvious that the pseu- 
sonymous authors are unable to assert anything edifying about 
either.
My personality is a presupposition psychologically 
necessary to force him out (the young man in 
Repetition) while my personality will never be able 
to get to the point he has reached, for the prim­
itive power by which he advances is a new and 
different factor.10
...but I admit also that I have not the courage 
for it, (namely the movement of faith) and that 
I renounce gladly any prospect of getting further—  
if only it were possible that in any way, however 
late, I might get so far.
The very choice of Kierkegaard to use the various pseudonyms
is an indication of the seriousness of his apologetic. One
could not be a Christian-of-sorts and be a Christian absolutely
in the same breath!
10 S^ren Kierkegaard, Repetition, Translated with Intro­
duction and Notes by Walter Lowrie (New York, 1964), p. 137.
11 S/ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Sickness unto 
Death, Translated with Introductions and Notes by Walter Lowrie 
(Garden City, 1954), p. 124.
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In order to edify, the author of the Edifying Discourses 
must find man where he is. The precise location of man assumed 
in the pseudonymous writings is within the Hegel-Goethian 
framework. In this ideally historical location man is not open 
to the possibility of religion and the h o p e  of edification is 
absurd. How then is Kierkegaard to speak edifyingly to his read­
ers? First he clears the way with the pseudonymous authorship 
by showing precisely what is not, and cannot be, edifying. The 
location of the pseudonymous authorship as prior to the Edifying 
Discourses is in the publicfe notion only. In fact, the pseudony­
mous and those signed S^ren Kierkegaard were published simultan­
eously. The underlying purpose of the entire aesthetic authorship 
is to enable the individual to be edified. Thus the edifying 
works are first in order of importance. The Edifying Discourses 
of themselves do not need the Hegelian vocabulary. Rather con­
temporary man needs the Hegelian vocabulary in order to be found 
where he is. In fact, from the beginning many readers of Kierke­
gaard are much more pleased with the pseudonymous authors and as 
a rule probably are not familiar at ail with his Edifying Discourses. 
Socrates let every man use the words he found to be meaningful in 
order to state his case. Yet when the discussion was over the 
words used by the opponents of Socrates were found to mean nothing.
Kierkegaard lets man speak in the finitude of his own words (the
12pseudonymous authorship) and then turns around and allows the
12 0 man, how long shall my honour suffer shame?
How long will you love vain words, and seek after lies?
Psalms 4:2
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11the possibility of the infinite to edify.
In the Edifying Discourses nevertheless it cannot be as­
sumed that S^ren Kierkegaard's apologetic is concerned more with 
the specifically "Christian" than with the possibility of religion 
in general. (Or in a sense natural religion.) The aesthetic 
literature taken in its entirety is an attempt to illuminate the 
problem of "what it is to become a Christian" and in no direct 
way answers it. To assume any of the authors involved to be 
"Christian" is to destroy the intricate balance of Kierkegaard's 
authorship. This also includes S^ren Kierkegaard himself (author 
of the Edifying Discourses) at this stage in his life. Kierkegaard 
was presenting Christianity as he witnessed it in himself. He was 
convinced that when it came to Christianity, Christendom could do 
nothing but remain silent. His overall presentation of the re­
ligious in its relation to Christianity was a gradual and serious 
task. One didn't just busy himself within Christ endom and then 
pick up Christianity as one does a best-selling novel. First one 
must see the religious for what it is, and then begin to see 
what Christianity is in relation to a religious openness to the 
infinite. The entire task of seeing through the deceits of 
Christendom was most difficult. Kierkegaard's idea of one being- 
a-Christian was filled with suffering, obedience and inwardness.
He had had moments of "indescrible joy" in his life as a Christian 
before 1843 but he regarded a Christian life more as an eternal 
and absolute duty than periodic flashes of salvation.
13 let no evil talk come out of your mouths, but only 
such as is good for edifying, as fits the occasion, that it may 
impart grace to those who hear, Ech, 4:29,
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The difference between Author A, Author B, Victor Eremita, 
Constantine Constantius, Johannes de Silentio and S/ren Kierke­
gaard is that in S^ren Kierkegaard's Edifying Discourses the 
possibility of religion and Christianity is not viewed negatively 
(in absent i a ) before it has been experienced. (In fact, it is 
continuously exalted.) In the pseudonymous writings a personal 
option for a religious comprehension of the personality is par­
ticularly avoided. The "religious"1^ is defined in the pseudony­
mous literature, but usually in the second-hand vocabulary of the 
interested non-believer.
Understanding the "religious" within Kierkegaard's collective 
authorship demands an entente cordiale of the Edifying Discourses. 
Whereas the pseudonymous writers neutralize the reader, S^ren 
Kierkegaard edifies him. A part-time Christian, a pagan, a roman­
ticist, an Hegelian, a rationalist, an aesthetic and a judge 
could read the pseudonymous works and, in sympathy with their 
own various levels of interpretation, find therein a swarm of 
momentary subjective satisfactions or discontentments. In no 
direct sense would one find there any expression of certitude or 
faith. The Edifying Discourses on the other hand are written in 
light of the believer who begins with Divine Wisdom. There can 
be no holding on to both at once. The pseudonymous literature
14 The meaning of the word "religious" has become so en­
grossed in a vocabulary which invariably subjects the mystery 
of Christianity to some system of explanation, be it reason, 
feeling, or humanism, that people like Bonhoeffer have suggest­
ed a religionless Christianity. It is not Christianity's fault 
that it lost the word "religion" rather man sacrificed it on the 
human altar of subjectivism.
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1 1is not completed by tne Barfyxng -Oiscoercss, ' lee kiarue-
guardian apologetic mas concerned with enabling the non--0hr
(or so-called Christian} so view both the pseudonymous enin
and the Edifying Discourses and to chocso one or the other.
The duplicity in the deeper sense, that is, in 
the sense of the authorship as a whole, is not 
at all what was a subject of comment in its tine, 
viaa the contrast between the two parts of 
Sither/Or. ho, the duplicity is discovered by ^
comparing Either/Or and the Two Edifying Discourses, °
15 The relationship of the Edifying hiscoursa3 10 The 
pseudonymous literature is not a :brtnp'ihn}~hl  "■'h .;n::A;
■ o v e i n  02. inv.it 0 o s i / -  v i ,
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Chapter 2„ The Relation of the 
Rseudorymous Literature to the 
Edifying hiscerrses
Ko man can serve two masters; for either he will hate 
the one and love the other or else he will stand by the 
one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and 
mammon,^
Volume 1 and Volume la of Either/Or constitute a whole,
....  1 ....
Repetition and Fear and Trembling tale up specific issues which 
are introduced in Eithsr/Or cut left incomplete. The secret of 
both pseudonymous series however, can only ca understood in light 
of the Edifying Discourses, Left to themselves the pseudonymous 
authors present "an indirect polemic against speculative philoso-
-t C
phy which is indifferent to the existential." s Kierkegaard was 
aware that the world would grasp this relationship of the pseudo­
nymous literature to the Edifying Discourses only with, great 
difficulty:
I held out Either/Or to the world in my left hand, 
and in my right the Two Edifying Discourses; but 
all„ or as good as all, grasped with their right 
hand what I held in my left.
To discover whether as writer behind the pseudonymous muses
17 Matt, 5s24
18 Either/Or3 Vol„ I, Translator's Preface, p, z,
19 Foinr of View, p, 20. The situation today would be some­
what different in that much modern thee Lory is convinced than 
there is no difference hew,"sen the right red left i.aoi and., if
right and the right left. To do treadee w; all- ere would no a 
forget these who come forth with no haul. - two fig rue, wo; 
or id tongue«
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Kierkegaard is captivated by the aesthetics!. the ethic-a!, r
any other pseudonymous category is to begin at the wrong place.
Lowrie makes the observation;
If a reader should carelessly fail to observe that 
Either/Or presents an either/or— either the aesthetic 
of the 'ethical life— and should happen to be unaware 
that the author had already chosen decisively the 
second alternative*. .his praise of the book or his 
condemnation would be alike futile.20
Victor Eremite is closer to Kierkegaard’s purpose when he men­
tions that he had not yet been able to relinquish the idea that
one man could be the author of both parts and that he who says
21A must also say B.
The decisive importance of Either/Or is revealed in the 
distinction between the aesthetic and the ethical, and the im­
possibility of mediating these two into a third category— the 
religiousc Repetition begins by attempting to solve the problem 
of human freedom in relation to repetition. It ends by discover­
ing that the matter properly belongs to the sphere of religion,,
All that Constantins can say is that he is unable to discuss the 
problem at that level. At least he admits a distinction between 
experimental psychology and faith. Johannes de Silentio in 
Fear and Trembling also makes it clear that the fear and vrsrbling 
of faith is something to which he is unable to assentc Ho afrits 
that it is more passionate than a dialectical lyric, tut poetry
20 Walter Lowrie, KierkssraardVolume I {'hv York.
1962), p. 252, ' i“
21 Preface of Sither./Or, Vol., I, p. lj.
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is as far as he can gcu
Gradually the pseudonymous authors move from a position 
indifferent to religion., to a position which, is recognised in 
ins opposition to faith,. Kierkegaard's apologetics does net 
seek to have the pseudonymous authors Pslegianise their way into 
Christianity as if such was possible. Faith remains a gift, some­
thing to be given and something to be willed. It will never be 
attained from non-faithful considerations. The non-bs1iever mist 
first admit of his ncn-belief (his despair). As long as the 
non-Christian member of Christendom fails to admit of his lack of 
faith, he will never know "what God asks.” He will only know de­
spair, even though he will continually ask himself why his faith 
is so uncertain, passionless, busy and unhappy.
The purpose of the pseudonymous authorship is to free Kier­
kegaard, the man of faith, from the quasi-Christian ambiguities 
of Christendom, The concern of the pseudonymous personalities 
is of importance to the man of faith only in so far as religion 
stands apart as a testimony to their inadequacies. The believer 
deals with the world out of the strength of his faith. He has 
overcome the ambiguity of the pseudonymous neanderings by refus­
ing to accept them to begin with. The man of faith accepts the 
worldj not in the hope that it will give him faith, but in the 
wisdom of God which has Itself made the world worthy of acceptance. 
It is clear in the Edifying Discourses that all aesthetic utter­
ances of man and all submissions to the dictates of ethics will
u::3 of one cloth, faith is something else.
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In Sierhkegaard?s authorship there is no attempt to molars 
the Edifying Discourses and the pseudonymous vjriting. The spclo­
pe tics of Spren Kierkegaard does not continue where Author I? or 
Aohannes de Silentio leave off. Rather* in the Sdifylng Pis- 
pourses S/ren Kierkegaard begins at a totally different starting 
place. The difference between the various pseudonymous investi­
gations is relative * the difference between these and the religious 
language of the Edifying Discourses is absolute,.
The awesoussise and complexity of the pseudonymous author­
ship (especially Either/Or) makes a comparison with the Edifying 
Discourses difficult. Yet the very disproportion indicates the 
simplicity of the religious as compared to the labyrinth of the 
pseudonymous ambiguity. To be a man of faith the intrigues of 
modern philosophy are not necessary. If faith demanded doubt as 
a necessary prerequisite then faith is merely an adjunct to and 
a product of a system of philosophy* and as such should find its 
strength primarily in relation to this system. Likewise* if faith 
demanded this doubtful interpretation of faith* faith should be 
abandoned or gone beyond, in favor of a more totally human inves­
tigation of the aesthetiealf ethical and temporal nature of man.
To the writer c-f the Edifying Discourses any such idea of 
going beyond faith* of living in a mere conducive time in rela­
tion to faith, of being more psychologically at ease to receive 
faith, of having the necessary good fortune to urd era tana, faith* 
ci being more mature in regard to faith, or of being in relation 
to Christ any different than those mho lived around Him, is 
totally foreign.
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2 0
It is true that he who expects something in partic­
ular, may be disappointed; but this does not happen 
to the believer. When the world begins its sharp 
testing, when the storms of life snap the vigorous 
expectation of youth, when existence, which seems so 
loving and so gentle, transforms itself into a mer­
ciless proprietor who demands everything back, 
everything which he gave so that he could take it 
back; then the believer looks with sadness and pain 
at himself and at life, but he still says: "There
is an expectation which all the world can not take 
from me; it is the expectation of faith, and this is 
victory. I am not deceived; for what the world seemed 
to promise me, that promise I still did not believe that 
it would keep; my expectation was not in the world, 
but in God.22
When doubt begins to fill the modern soul, it is not simply me­
diated into a higher state by Srfren Kierkegaard, rather it is 
completely overturned by being shown in relation to faith. Doubt 
in the Edifying Discourses is seen as despair and not as a neces­
sary increment to faith.
Then you humbly acknowledged before God that God 
tempts no man, but that everyone is tempted when 
he is seduced and drawn away by his own desires,
Just as you were tempted by proud and arrogant 
and defiant thoughts...
Then you acknowledged, humble and ashamed, that it 
was well that you, in your despair, should not have 
found an explanation of life's dark saying which 
anyone would be able to insist upon.23
In the third Edifying Discourse entitled "Love covers a 
multitude of sins" S^ren Kierkegaard makes it clear that it is 
one thing to start with "love covers a multitude of sins" and 
another to start with'bin discovers a multitude of sins." One
22 Sdren Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses, Volume I, Trans­
lated by David P. Swenson and Lillian iviarvin Swenson (Minneapolis, 
1962), p. 43,
23 Ibid.. p. 59.
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begins with sir. cr with faithful levs™ Ileus is ae 
e un ran. into love., A parson con snort vith doubt cr ''buy be; 
r.c ;~::'Dirz:..v of denoting will give c m  faith. It is net r.::til cue 
m  vysuiees she futility of doubtful investigations tint us sou. 
rill to believe. H e  entire display cf the pseudonymous meander- 
fugs cannot make sense of the Edifying Discourses., Batherr iris 
concern of Sfrsn Kierkegaard is for the believer. Every Inman 
irvostigation is bondage until it is overcome faithfully in tbs 
lore of doc.c Once this love has conquered, man can return to
durum activityf but not as a hunianisf? psychologist, philosopher
0-1
css theologian^ but as a Christian. Siren Kierkegaard has cveroonie 
she world in faith and returned to it with God’s help, for the 
author of the Edifying Discourses man is not alone, but God 1s
—  ^  -   --- —  - mi—  -I --    4-
with the man viio again accepts the world,:
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Chapter 3- The Edifying
But he who does the truth comes to the light that 
his deeds may he made manifest, for they have been 
performed in God.25
With the words of a Jutland pastor, "For only the truth
p/T
which edifies is truth for you," Either/Or closes. The reader 
is left wondering, "what is the truth which edifies?" It is ap­
parent that neither Author A nor Author B are capable of import­
ing to the reader anything concerning the truth which edifies.
27It is not until the reader takes notice of the Edifying Discourses
that he or she is able to meet the truth which edifies.
To begin with Kierkegaard chooses the word "edifying" as a
calculated assault on Hegelian philosophy.
It is curious what a hate Hegel has for the edifying 
as is everywhere apparent. The edifying is not an 
opiate that lulls to sleep, however, it is the finite 
spirit's Amen and one side of knowledge that ought not
be overlooked.28
Instead of the edifying, Hegel chose to endorse the concept of
25 John 3s21
26 S/ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Volume II, Translated 
by Walter Lowrie with revisions and a forward by Howard A.
Johnson (Garden City, 1959), p. 356.
27 Throughout the entire stage of his aesthetic writing 
Kierkegaard accompanied every pseudonymous work with an Edifying 
Discourse. According to Kierkegaard's own count there were 
eighteen Discourses published along with the several pseudonymous 
works.
28 So'ren Kierkegaard, Johannes Olimacus or, De Omnibus 
Dubitandum Est and A Sermon, translated with, an assessment by 
T. H. Crcxail, D, S. (Stanford, 1967), p. 97.
22
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mediation. Mediation in Kierkegaard's mind was simply a process
proper to a system of logic. It is important to distinguish here
between the ironic beginnings (absolute negativity) of Socratic
philosophy and the "nothingness" with which Hegelian philosophy
29began. Whereas the absolute nothingness of Socrates  ^was not 
closed to the possibility of edifying, the nothingness of Hegel 
was simply the uncriticized foundation for more and more media­
tions. As usual, Kierkegaard finds Hegelian assumptions arrested 
at the hands of Socratic irony.
Kierkegaard says of mediation: "Give that up, and there is
no speculation; if you admit it there is no absolute choice, no 
either/or.
The matter can be summarized in this fashion: Hegelian
mediation is destroyed by a serious regard for "either/or."
That is, Socratic irony is quite capable of letting the media­
tion of the System expose itself to self-destruction. But then 
man is left with the question, how can one come to grips with the 
religious category if he remains ambiguously in the category of 
either/or? Can a man who has become an either/or get beyond the 
absolute negative of Socrates? Kierkegaard believes he can. It 
is not however as if a man goes from mediation to either/or and
29 In so far as he (Socrates) emancipates mankind from 
the fear of death, he gives them in exchange the anxious repre­
sentation of an inevitable something of which one knows nothing. 
Accordingly, one must be accustomed to being edified by the 
reassurance residing in nothingness in order to find repose 
in this. Spren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, translated 
with an Introduction and Notes by Lee M, Caoel (Bloomington, 1968),
p. 118.
3° Either/Cr, Vol. II, 0. 177.
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then on to edification. Mediation is reality regarded as thought. 
"Either/or” is reality as it finds itself to be, but in relation­
ship to the absolute negative. Edification is reality as it 
finds itself to be, but now regarded as something given.^ There 
does exist a relationship between the eternal witnessed by its 
absence and natural religion. There is no relation, however, be­
tween mediation and either/or, between mediation and edifying, 
or between existence regarded as doubtful and existence regarded 
as wonder.
Whereas Kierkegaard*s use of either/or points out what is 
not religious and not open to the infinite, his use of the edify­
ing witnesses the possibility of the religious or better, wit­
nesses the reality of natural religion.
The fact that modern man has lost sight of this situation 
and taken under his own supervision what previously has been 
•given' by God under the name of natural religion, has led man 
to mediate and mediate and mediate unto the point where no one 
can understand another unless he too agrees to undertake the 
same systematic mediation. The problem always remains the same. 
Prom where does one begin to mediate and when can one stop?
Hence, in our age as the order of the day we have 
the disgusting sight of young men who are able to 
mediate Christianity and paganism, are able to play 
with the titanic forces of history, and are unable 
to tell a plain man what he has to do in life, and
31 In the words of John the Baptist, "Ho one can receive 
anything unless it is given to him from heaven." John 3:27
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who do not know any better what they themselves 
have to do.32
The edifying also has the ability to come to grips with 
the future, something which mediation can do only by recalling 
the past.
Philosophy turns towards the past, towards the 
whole enacted history of the world, it shows how 
the discrete factors are fused in a higher -unity, 
it mediates and mediates.33
For the future can be overcome only through eternity. And con
cern with the eternal is the precise interest of the edifying.
Edifying, like every word signed S^ren Kierkegaard, finds its
beginning in the religious category of Faith. The hope of
S^ren Kierkegaard is that the Edifying Discourses will finally
meet
that individual whom with joy and gratitude I call 
my reader, that individual whom it seeks, toward 
whom, as it were, it stretches out its arms; that 
individual who is benevolent enough to let himself 
be found, benevolent enough to receive it, whether 
in the moment of meeting it found him happy and 
confident, or melancholy and thoughtful.
The Edifying Discourses were written for the believer.
"Edifying" is a positive religious category. It is not the
logically necessary category of Hegelian mediation. If it wer
32 Either/Or, Vol. II, p. 175. These are the words of 
Author B, though not edifying, they at least call a spade a 
spade. It seems much of contemporary theology likes to call a 
spade a heart when actually it only considers "clubs."
33 Ibid., p. 174.
34 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, Preface, p. 21.
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included within the Hegelian framework it could not edify in 
any sense, but simply keep one busy. Related to mediation, 
edification would become more like the word superego, and as 
such it would be strictly a hypothetical construct with which 
one must work to carry on the business of finding another and 
possibly a more inclusive hypothetical construct. For S^ren 
Kierkegaard, only concerns of faith edify.
Edification, moreover, was not a negative religious cate­
gory. Although concern for the infinite (or religion) within 
the language of Socratic irony was not absent, it was negative. 
That is, it was witnessed only in its absence, much like the 
absent God of Bergman's movies. Religion taken in this sense 
was the concern of the pseudonymous authors and not that of 
Sj2(ren Kierkegaard. Whereas S^ren Kierkegaard edified in his 
discourses, the pseudonymous writers could at best point out 
that such edification was possible, but it was not the concern 
of non-believers such as Johannes de Silentio to deal with it 
positively.
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Part II
Some Specific Aesthetic Insights 
Relating to Time, Place and State of Be-ing
Chapter i. The Moment and the Instant
We shall all indeed rise, hut we shall not all be 
changed—  in a momen^, in the twinkling of an eye, 
at the last trumpet.
The initial context of the moment is taken from the Greek 
notion of "the sudden" (to $$rziQ*,'is)a.& found in Plato's Parmen-
p
ides. This notion of the moment is especially clear in Magister
Kierkegaard's MA Thesis, The Concept of Irony.
Its (irony's) relation to the world is not such that 
this relation is a moment in the content of person­
ality. Its relation to the world is never at any moment 
to be in relation to the world, its relation is such that 
at the moment this is about to commence, it draws itself 
back with a sceptical closedness. (£r'o.i'i) But this re­
serve is the reflex of personality into itself that is 
clearly abstract and void of content. The ironical person­
ality is therefore merely the outline of a personality. Hence
1 I Cor. 15:52.
2 The word 'instant' appears to mean something such that 
from it a thing passes to one or other of the two conditions.
There is no transition from a state of rest so long as the thing
is still at rest, nor from motion so long as it is still in motion, 
but this queer thing, the instant, is situated between the motion 
and the rest; it occupies no time at all, and the transition of 
the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing 
of being in motion, takes place In and from the instant. Accord­
ingly* Ike one, since it both is at rest and is in motion, must 
pass from the one condition to the other— only so can it do both 
things— and when it passes, it makes the transition instantaneously 
it occupies no time in making it and at that moment it, cannot be 
either in motion or at rest. (The Collected Dialogues of Plato, 
edited by Edith. Hamilton and Huntington Cairns ; liew York, lyt-1 j, 
p. 947.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
one sees that there is an absolute dissimilarity between 
Socrates and Christ; for in Christ dwelt the immediate 
fullness ox the godhead* and his relation to the world 
is an absolutely real relationship, so that the Church 
is conscious of itself as the members of its b o d y , 3
This Socratic concept of the moment is then related to Hegel's 
mediated use of the moment. The outcome of this relationship be­
tween the dialectical moment of Hegel and the ironic moment of 
Socrates is expressed in the words of Author A:
There are many who think that they live thus, because 
after having done the one or the other, they combine or 
mediate the opposites. But this is misunderstanding; 
for the true eternity does not lie behind either/or, 
but before it. Hence, their eternity will be a painful 
succession of temporal moments, for they will be con­
sumed by a twofold regret.
The negative moment of Socrates is far more hopeful than Hegel's
mediated use of the term. It becomes obvious that in the mouth
of Author A the prodigiously interesting moment as understood
by Hegel is left to a dialectical self-destruction. When fin-
. 5
ished with some of the dialectic intrigues of Author A the reader 
would be glad to go back to the "outline of a personality" of­
fered by Socrates rather than stay suspended within the despair­
ing grasp of mediation.^
3 Concept of Irony, p. 242.(This work was completed Sept. 16,
1841)
4 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 38.
5 Hang yourself, you will regret it; do not hang yourself, 
and you will also regret that; hang yourself or do not hang your­
self, you will regret both; whether you hang yourself or do not 
hang yourself, you will regret both. This gentlemen, is the sum 
and substance of all philosophy. (Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 37.)
6 Mediation as such is not opposed to Christianity, in fact 
it is frequently found in Scripture:
But as it is, Christ has obtained a ministry which 
is as much more excellent than the old as the covenant
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Once the ironic use of the moment begins to develop in 
Kierkegaard's authorship the interest of the concept switches 
from a relation to either/or and takes up residence mainly with­
in the more developed concepts of repetition and fear and trem­
bling,^ In this later development the moment acquires a more
Q
important meaning, so much so in fact that there is a noticeable 
change found in Kierkegaard's vocabulary (especially the pseudony 
mous literature) from the term "moment" to the word "instant."
The moment however, is not absent from the Edifying Discourses 
and is as forcefully present in the fifth as in the first.
The relationship of the moment to the Infinite and how the 
q
new term repetition goes beyond the finite shrewdness of medi­
ation and the negativity of either/or makes it clear that either 
a new meaning must be given to "the moment" or a new word must 
be chosen to replace it. Wishing not to destroy the time-bound 
implications of "the moment" Kierkegaard willed to initiate a 
new word, "the instant."
6 cont.
he mediates is better, since it is enacted on better
promises. (Heb. 8:6)
The distinction is based not on the rejection of a word, but on 
the interpretation of its meaning. In the Letter to the Hebrews 
mediation draws its strength from the promise of God. Where does 
Hegelian mediation draw its strength?
7 Here dread could also be mentioned but a more particular 
interest in this term does not come -until Kierkegaard's pseudony­
mous muse Vigilius Haufniensis writes a book by that name in 1844
8 Just as, in a way, one could say that the New Testament 
is more important than the Old Testament.
9 See Part III, Chapter 2.
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Croxall defines the two Danish words as:
Moment means the temporal passing moment, in which 
the aesthetic as such (in his selfishness) lives.
0iblik means the decisive instant (an atom of eternity) 
when Eternity impinges upon Time and makes its eternal 
demands upon us— demands of duty and surrender.10
As Kierkegaard's authorship grew and the pseudonymous in­
vestigations began to take up the religious problem in greater 
detail (even though as un-believing observers) a more specifi­
cally religious vocabulary was needed. In Authors A and B, 
mention of religion was usually nebulously similar to the ethical 
or referred to in a distinctly other-person sort of way as if 
religion had an impact on culture but was now a thing of the 
past. The pressing task of the pseudonymous muse was to get on 
with the aesthetical preoccupations. The one outstanding ex­
ception in Either/Or falls at the end of Vol. II where a sermon 
of a Jutland pastor is recorded by Author B so that Author A 
could read it and think of himself. It was entitled: "The Ed­
ification Implied In the Thought that as Against God We Are 
Always in the Wrong." In its very organization and style a 
similarity to the Edifying Discourses can be discerned. Such 
words as: the wish, the future, doubt, the instant, duty and
inward point out a close affinity between it and the Edifying 
Discourses. The sermon ends with these words, "for only the 
truth which edifies is truth for you." It seems that for the 
sake of those not yet convinced of his purpose Kierkegaard left 
one final calling card.
10 T. H. Croxall, Kierkegaard Studies (lew York, 1967), 
p. 28.
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Returning to an investigation of the concept of the moment,
11it like the occasion, receives its more prodigiously interest­
ing definition at the hands of the pseudonymous muses. Whereas 
its religious understanding is found in the entirely different 
domain of the Edifying Discourses, that niche where S,^ren Kier­
kegaard avoids the poetic coteries of the pseudonymous flaneurs 
"by beginning with the "expectation of faith!"
...for if there were no future (expectation of faith), 
neither would there have been a past, and if there 
were neither past nor future, then would man be en­
slaved like the beasts, his head bent toward the earth, 
his soul ensnared in the service of the moment, "*2
Man determined within the category of the moment is no dif­
ferent than the animal, except that man is able to create a 
system which adroitly orders these moments as if they were com­
plete in themselves. (That is, subjected to the category of the 
moment man begins to think that he can construct existence.) 
Wouldn't it be momentarily satisfying in solving life's problem 
if one could simply wish his consciousness to vanish and then 
study himself as a non-rational animal? The author of the 
Edifying Discourses regards momentary satisfaction as a shrewd 
form of despair.
In Authors A and B the moment is concerned with the finite 
exhaustion of reality under the sole category of time. Taken 
finitely every moment is its own limit. There is to be no unity 
of moments except in the mind of man. Author A however, makes
11 See Part II, Chapter 3.
12 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 34.
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some sense of the moment when he related it to the sensual
erotic which finds its true home in the musical.
Only in this manner (Mozarts’ Don Juan) can Don Juan 
become epic, in that he constantly finishes, and 
constantly begins again from the beginning, for his
life is the sum of repellent moments which have no
coherence, his life as moment is the sum of moments, 
as the sum of moments is the moment.^3
Residing in this unreflective category of immediacy the moment 
is freed from the linguistic mediation of Hegel. Such a relation 
of the moment to immediacy, however, seems to self-destruct as 
soon as it is bom. As soon as it becomes something in relation 
to anything else it no longer has immediacy as its nature. Thus 
as soon as the immediate sensuous erotic, defined musically, is
grasped, it is gone. One is left wondering if it would be pos­
sible to live existentially in the immediate sensuous erotic 
which sounds so passionately throughout Mozart's Don Juan? Yet 
it seems that even though immediate existence is closer to the 
passion of fear and trembling found in Constantius' Knight of 
Paith than the reflective relationship of Author B's ethical 
personality to the universal, immediate existence is still not 
the life of faith. Just as Author B attempts to set the occasion 
straight for Author A by ushering in the universal "calling," 
present to all men, Author B attempts to destroy the power of 
the immediate by ordering life in accord with the universality 
of duty. In either case the understanding of man is ordered up
13 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 95.
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solely in terms of the finite. Author A chooses the garment 
of the immediate. Author B chooses the garment of the univer­
sal. And again the words of editor Victor Eremita come to mind, 
"that he who says A must also say B",1^
Most men in our age find themselves in the anxious position
of regarding the moment in its completely finite character as 
somehow Infinite. They wish to find this life as lived moment 
by moment to be of eternal significance in their own terms re­
gardless of any God. Eternity or Infinitude. By a sleight of 
their own hand men find themselves in the embarrassingly shallow
position of wishing the finite to be Infinite. Such a metamor-
15phosis demands more than man's wish! Man has become lost in
the present moment and not willing to admit his mistake, he has
hoped to overcome the confusion by making the resulting confusion 
itself God.
Without knowing how it comes about, they are in the 
midst of the life movement, a link in the chain which 
connects a future with a past. Unconcerned about how
14 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 13.
15 The writer of the Edifying Discourses treats the wish 
differently;
'I. .that is the way a man should speak; for the wish 
profits nothing." Then would he quietly review his 
inner emotions; and every time his soul allowed it­
self to rest on a wish, he called it to him and said:
"You know you must not wish"; and in so doing he made 
progress. When his soul became fearful he called it 
to him and said: "If you are anxious, it is because
you are wishing; for fear is a form of wishing, and 
you know you must not wish"— and so he went on.
(Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 28.)
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it happeuqd they are borne along on the wave of the 
present.,b
Whether the moment finds man in pleasure for-a-time, or whether
* 7it finds man shrewdly satisfied with a "rotation method"1 of
cautiously arranged moments, all of this does not concern the
author of the Edifying Discourses.
How could one who steers toward perfection under the 
full sail of hope, have many moments to spend on 
merely human possibilities?
Any contact with Pelegian diminutives was avoided by Spfren Kier­
kegaard as a temptation which reduced man-the-individual to the 
momentary, curious and freedom-less category of the mob. If 
freedom is to exist in man, how is man to stand in relation to 
the moment? Is human activity simply a necessary succession of 
moments in which freedom is lost, determined in its relation to 
the past? Is human activity free only in the immediacy of the 
present, thus making any connection with the past or future im­
possible, and therefore, condemning man like a non-rational 
animal to the present moment? Or is human activity to seek its 
freedom in relation to the future, in its hope and universality, 
thereby condemning man to a hope which as such does not exist 
except in relation to that which is not?
Freedom as found in the Edifying Discourses escapes these 
never-ending questions by beginning in an entirely different
16 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p, 46.
17 Chapter Eight of Either/Or, Vol. I.
Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 89,
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place. For man to be free be must define his personality in
relation to the Infinite. No series of finite mediations will
bring this about. Again the secret of S/ren Kierkegaard’s
Edifying Discourses lies in his starting point. There can be
no question of mediating our way to the Infinite. The reader
cannot be forced to choose, but can only be shown the difference
between beginning with worldly desires, pleasure, and despair
and beginning with the Infinite where is found the expectation
of faith, the giver of every good and every perfect gift; the
one who covers a multitude of sins; and the one who strengthens
in the inner man.
Only he who abandoned his soul to worldly desires, he 
who chose the glamorous thraldom of pleasure and was 
not able to free himself from its thoughtless or mel­
ancholy fear, only he is content to let creation bear 
witness so that he can shrewdly and cleverly use it in 
the service of the moment. y
In the fifth Edifying Discourse S^ren Kierkegaard compares 
the moment to the eternal which is truly the concern of the 
moment.
Through every deeper reflection, which makes a man 
older than the moment, and lets him grasp the eternal, 
he assures himself that he has an actual relation to 
the world, and that consequently this relationship 
cannot consist merely in a knowledge about this world 
and about himself as a part of it, since such a know­
ledge is not a relationship, precisely because in this 
knowledge he himself is indifferent to this world, and 
this world is indifferent to his knowledge about it.
Not until concern awakens in his soul as to what the 
world signifies to him and he to the world, what every­
thing in him through which he belongs to the world, 
signifies to him, and he through it to the world, in 
that moment does the inner man proclaim itself in this 
concern.20
19 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 109.
20 Ibid., pp. no-111.
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Thus as man "becomes "older than the moment" he "begins to define 
himself in relation to the Sternal in such a way that the ataraxy 
of the moment gives way to the passion of faith. The moment no 
longer is a temporal category, it is ablaze in the passionate 
conflict that finds the finite face to face with the Infinite.
The moment has vanished, the instant is bom! The possibility 
of the instant, however, does not destroy the moment but only 
sets the human personality in relation to freedom. At any 
moment the temporality of despair can return. Repetition of 
the momentary life is possible but it is not the occasion of 
human freedom. Rather, it is a return to the despair of deter­
minism in the past. With repetition of the instant, however, 
man has willed to receive the gift of the Infinite and as such 
is not determined in the past, present, or future, but has over­
come time and made it his servant by repeating the Eternal.
In Fear and Trembling the Knight of Infinite Resignation 
takes the moment as far as it can go by totally renouncing the 
world. He stands on the threshold of the instant. Only the 
Knight of Faith can put the instant to use. By the teleological 
suspension of the ethical, Abraham (as a Knight of Faith) re­
jects both the immediate and the universal categories of the 
moment and takes the absurd step in faith. The very absurdity 
(non-understandability) of the choice indicates its total de­
parture from the moment. As Abraham witnessed the absolute call 
of God he was defined in relation to the instant. Every category 
of time was overcome, the instant was born and Abraham stood 
individual, alone, and absurd (in the temporal eyes of man)
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before God.
Johannes de Silentio though himself unable to make the
movement of faith— to realize the instant — presents faith with
an integrity which at least gives faith its proper place and
does not define it in Hegelian categories.
In our time nobody is content to stop with faith 
but wants to go further. It would perhaps be rash 
to ask where these people are going, but it is
surely a sign of breeding and culture for me to as­
sume that everybody has faith, for otherwise it. 
would be queer for them to be...going further.
It is supposed to be difficult to understand Hegel, 
but to understand Abraham is a trifle.22
With the use of the instant the pseudonymous writers, 
Constantine and Johannes, one delivering an essay in experimen­
tal psychology and the other a dialectical lyric, are proclaim­
ing the necessary independence of the religious from the psy­
chological and the poetic. The once-removed discussion of the 
religious faith by the pseudonymous muses gradually makes it 
clear that any relation of the religious with the aesthetical 
must be carried out in terms of the religious and not vice 
versa. Any mediation of this distinction immediately offers 
religion up to the system of Hegelian philosophy.
The instant then destroys mediation's hold on religion as 
a premise contained solely in the natural order. And, on the 
other hand, it dispels the ironic relationship of the moment
21 Fear and Trembling, p. 23.
22 Ibid., p. 43.
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to absolute negativity by establishing it in relation to the
positive principle of the Infinite. Yftiereas Socratic ignorance
2~<
is founded in Infinite resignation J the faith of Abraham re­
quires everything anew in terms of the absurd which puts Abraham
24in an absolute relation to the absolute.
23 Fear and Trembling, p. 79.
24 Ibid., p. 72.
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Chapter 2. The Occasion
So if thy right eye is an occasion of sin to thee, 
pluck it out and cast it from thee.,.25
The first Edifying Discourse is entitled "The Expectation 
of Faith.' It is written as a commentary on Gal. 3:28-29 to 
be delivered on New Year's Day. For S^ren Kierkegaard the pro­
per use of the term occasion receives its direction from the 
words of St. Paul:
There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is 
neither slave nor free, there is neither 
male nor fema^g; for you are all one in 
Christ Jesus.
The celebration of aesthetical and ethical occasions have been
radically reversed. No longer does the cultural, social or
sexual occasion primarily determine man's existence. Faith in
Christ Jesus now becomes the starting point within which man
27is to understand the occasion, '
The myth used by man to explain life does not determine
pQ
man's faith. Rather the faith of man in God determines the
25 Matt. 5:29.
26 Gal. 3:28.
27 For I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, 
nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor 
powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, 
will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus 
our Lord. Rom, 8:38-39.
28 ...remain at Ephesus that you may charge certain persons 
not to teach any different doctrine, nor to occupy themselves wit 
myths and endless genealogies which promote speculations rather 
than the divine training that is in faith. I Tim. 1:3-4.
39
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"myth" wherein man conceptualises his thanksgiving. Bultman's 
demytholo gizing of scripture is "new" not because he is 
operating like the writers of the scriptures who seek to con­
ceptualize through faith, (to that extent all scripture is 
demytholo gizing in that it attempts to destroy all myths not 
founded in the belief of Jesus Christ) but because he finds 
an understanding of these myths outside a relationship to that 
same faith in God present to the writers of the sacred books. 
From what occasion does Bulhnann draw his vision?
The principal investigation of the occasion found in the 
pseudonymous authorship falls in the aesthetical half of 
Either/Or.
Occasion is thus of the greatest importance in re­
gard to every production; indeed, it is this which 
essentially decides the question regarding its true 
aesthetic value.29
The aestheticist who adopts aesthetics as his pro­
fession, and in his profession sees the real oc­
casion is eo ipso lost. This is by no means to say 
that he cannot perform his work skillfully; but the 
secret of all production he has not understood. He 
is too much a Pelagian autocrat to be able, in child­
ish wonder, to rejoice over the curious fact that it 
is as if alien powers had produced that which a 
human being believes is his own: the inspiration,
namely, and the occasion.30
One personification of this Pelagian autocrat is found later 
in Fear and Trembling where a parson is presented who is "de­
lighted with himself" and "at the earnest wrath which thundered
29 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 234.
30 ibid., p. 235,
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down'1 his personal oratory concerning Abraham of the Old 
Testament.
He said to himself and to his wife, "I am an 
orator. What I lacked was the occasion. When 
I talked about Abraham on Sunday I did not feel 
moved in the least^31
Johannes de Silentio the author of Fear and Trembling though
unwilling to become a Knight of Faith himself is pointing
out the weakness of any so-called faith which of itself is
dependent upon the occasion regarded as a lyric enhancement
of words. The parson had confused the occasion with faith.
In the old days they said, "What a pity things 
don’t go on in the world as the parson preaches"—  
perhaps the time is coming, especially with the 
help of philosophy, when they will say, "For­
tunately things don't go on as the parson preaches; 
for after all there is some sense in life, but 
none at all in his preaching."32
Author A continues to discuss the occasion making it clear
that left exhausted in the hands of the finite the occasion
can do nothing but self-destruct.
The occasion is a category of the finite, and it 
is impossible for immanent thinking to lay hold 
of it; for that it is too paradoxical. This can 
also be seen from the fact that that which comes 
out of the occasion is something quite different 
from the occasion itself, which is an absurdity 
for all immanent thought.33
The occasion is, then, in itself nothing, and 
only something in relation to that which it 
gives rise to, and in relation to this it is
31 Fear and Trembling, p. 40.
32 Ibid.
33 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 236.
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exactly nothing. For as soon as the occasion 
becomes something other than nothing, then 
it would stand in relatively immanent re­
lation to that which it produces, and would 
then be either ground or cause. Unless one 
holds on to this firmly, everything again 
becomes confused.34
For Author A the occasion reduced to its simplest expression 
cannot be self explanatory. In the last quote listed above 
the Hegelian categories of position, negation and mediation 
are used to cloth the occasion as it is offered up to the 
ready sword of Socratic irony.
To add a final touch to the ambiguity of Author A's dis­
course on the occasion he concludes:
What then is said here must be regarded as un­
necessary, like a superfluous title page which 
is not included when the work is b o u n d . 5
In addition to the parson found in Fear and Trembling, 
the "Seducer" who records his "Diary" in the last section of 
Either/Or1s aesthetical volume presents a classic study in 
the aesthetical manipulations of the occasion. The charm, wit, 
passion, insight, and endurance of the "Seducer" used to control 
the occasion is both finitely engrossing (so often found in­
discriminately endorsed in today's Playboy ethic) and immediate­
ly self-consuming.
In the first instance the point was that he 
(the Seducer) enjoyed egoistically and per­
sonally what in part was reality rs gift to him 
and in part was that with which he himself had
34 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 236.
35 Ibid,, p. 236.
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impregnated reality; in the second instance 
his personality was effaced, and he enjoyed 
this situation, and himself in the situation.
In the first instance he constantly needed 
reality as occasion, as factor; in the poetic...
Thus the poetic was constantly present^in the 
ambiguity in which he passed his life.-3
With these words, the life of the "Seducer" catches the eye 
as a restless movement between the scientific empiricist and 
the poet. The occasion has reality both in being-what-it-is 
and in being-what-it-is-considered-to-be. Somehow it must be 
both of these at once. This re-occuring theme of dialectical 
ambivilance initally and finally mitigates the character of 
the "Seducer" to a personality of hopeless despair.
For Author A the occasion is seen both in its immediacy, 
as was the senuous fruitlessness of Mozart's Don Juan and in 
its capacity of being controlled as is brought out in the 
Seducers shrewd use of the moment. How can one keep the im­
mediacy of the occasion and yet shrewdly adjust it to ones 
own wish?
Author B has some reassuring advice for the aesthetic
"Seducer." Whereas the "Seducer" must always be subject to the
whimsical immediacy of yet another occasion, the ethical man
has a calling.
In the first place a calling explains talent 
not as something accidental in existence but 
as the universal; in the second place, it ex­
hibits the universal in its true beauty. For 
talent is beautiful only when it is transfigured 
as a call, ana existence is beautiful only when 
everyone has a call... When a man has a calling 
he generally has a norm outside himself which,
36 Either/Or, Vol. I, pp. 301-302.
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without making him a slave, does nevertheless
prescribe in a measure what he must do, ap­
portions for him the time, often gives him 
occasion to begin. If for once he does not
make a success of his business, he hopes to
do it better next time, and this next time 
is not too far distant.8'
For the ethical author the immediacy of existence as witnes­
sed by Author A can only be put-a-right in terms of the uni­
versal. This reveals two new problems to be taken up in 
Repetition and Fear and Trembling. If the universal is the 
savior of the aesthetic after all, "how is man to be free in 
relation to the universal?" (Why is man’s freedom not lost 
in being determined in relation to the universal?) And second­
ly, if, in relation to the universal is to be the proper way to
conceive of human activity how is one to regard the religious 
personality?^
Thus the occasion served a double purpose in the pseudony­
mous literature. It was initially used in the mouth of Author 
A to point out the inevitable self destruction of any under­
standing of life based on the experience of an immediate re­
lationship to the finite. And on the other hand it forced the 
ethical author to confirm its relationship to the universal.
It is precisely at that point when the ethical is seen as re­
lated to the universal that the ethical is seen in its opposi­
tion to the religious. In fact, a dialectic lyric explicating
37 Either/Or, Vol. II, p. 298.
38 In the case of Abraham’s personality, according to 
Johannes de Silentio, one encounters the teleological suspen­
sion of the (universal) ethical.
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the decisive difference between ethics and religion is the 
point of Johannes de Silentio's authorship of Fear and 
Trembling.
How then does S/ren Kierkegaard religiously answer the 
problems investigated by the pseudonymous authors? In light 
of his ironic style of apologetics SjzCren Kierkegaard is not 
going to attempt an answer in terms of the pseudonymous ques­
tioners! Beginning at the wrong place in apologetics would make
■jq
religious offerings appear exhaustively human. The pseudony­
mous authors could argue with great diversity up to the thresh­
old of the religious but further than that they could not go.
If it were possible to argue one into the sphere of religion, 
then religion would be just another aesthetic category. To 
break the hold of the never-ending aesthetical questions, (the 
state of being an either/or) S^ren Kierkegaard sets the case 
of the religious in an entirely different discourse than is found 
in the pseudonymous literature. Without authority, Sjzfren 
Kierkegaard chooses to edify the reader. The finite perplex­
ities of Hegelian mediation could not be overcome from within 
the sphere of their own systematizing. Kierkegaard as thinker 
was convinced that he could not answer an improper question by 
accepting accidentally the premises of the questioner. With 
the publishing of the Edifying Discourses the infatuation with
39 From now on, therefore, we regard no one from a human 
point of view; even though we once regarded Christ from a 
human point of view, we regard him thus no longer. 2 Cor. 5:16.
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mediation was not questioned, rather it was radically denied 
as the necessary starting point. Religion as present in tra­
ditional Christianity and in Hegelian philosophy could not be 
mutually agreeable bed partners. For Kierkegaard it was simply 
one or the other! If a person is to 'allow philosophy to control 
religion then why not take the philosophy (as did Feuerbach, 
Nietzsche, and Marx) and do away with the accidential appendage 
called religion? Thus, to quote the pseudonymous muses as if 
they were speaking in the same way as S^ren Kierkegaard in the 
Edifying Discourses is to reduce the difference between the 
vocabulary of a believer and a non-believer to something ac­
cidential. If the task of religious apologetics is to distin­
guish between accidentally diverse disciplines, Christ is 
seen, not as the Son of C-od, but as Just another teacher among 
men. Surely there lived and will always live men who are con­
sidered better at distinguishing between disciplines than was 
Christ. Just as there will be in the world's terms better 
historians, sociologists, psychologists, preachers, ministers 
and humanitarians than Christ.
In Author A ’s discussion of the occasion he praises it 
as: "Essentially deciding the question regarding every pro-
A C'
duction's true aesthetic value."' The author of the Edifying 
Discourses finds existence to be Just the opposite. For him 
aesthetic value depends upon a person's willing to believe (Faith):
Whether his forehead was flattened almost like
a beast's or arched more proudly than the heavens;
40 See page 40, footnote #29.
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whether his arm was outstretched, to rule over king­
doms and countries, or to gather up the necessary 
gifts which fell from the rich man's table; whether 
his gesture was obeyed by thousands, or there was 
not a soul who paid attention to him; whether elo­
quence blossomed on his lips or only unintelligible 
sounds passed over them; whether he was the power­
ful man who defied the storm, or the defenceless 
woman who only sought shelter against the storm—  
it has nothing to do with the matter, my hearer, 
absolutely nothing.41
For S/^ren Kierkegaard there is a real need for the occasion,
but of itself the occasion does not create this need. The
immediate occasion as reflected throughout the writing of
Author A is determinate in so far as an activity accomplished
is exhausted by the immediacy of finitude. The author of the
Edifying Discourses discovers the significance of the occasion
only when viewed in relation to the Infinite.
My soul is not insensible to the joy or pain of 
the individual, but, God be praised, it is not
thus that the individual can prove or disprove
the expectation of faith. God be praised! Nor 
can time prove it or disprove it; for faith ex­
pects an eternity.42
In the second Edifying Discourse entitled "Every Good and Every
Perfect Gift is from Above" S^ren Kierkegaard uses St. Paul's
words to closely distinguish the religious from the aesthetic.
The apostle Paul says: "All of God's creation 
is good if it is received with thankfulness."
It is principally in order to warn against an 
earthly prudence which would enslave the believer 
in the service of ceremonial (the occasion) that
41 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.
42 Ibid., p. 48.
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the apostle says these words.^
To begin with an exhaustively human understanding of the oc­
casion is the enduring tendency of the aesthetic personality. 
Yet, cannot the initial assumptions of the aesthetic also come 
under examination? It seems to be a habit with the pseudonymous 
muses to question all but their own presuppositions.
The author of the Edifying Discourses points out that if 
the words of James: "every good gift and every perfect gift
if from above" are to have meaning then the reader must be 
aware that faith is not determined by man's own understanding 
of the occasion of faith itself, but rather by God in whom there 
is "no variableness neither shadow of turning."
Whereas the occasion is used in one way by Author A and 
in another by Author B, S^ren Kierkegaard escapes any ambiguity 
in expressing the occasion by casting it that meaning witnes­
sed by the apostolic words: "Love covers a multitude of sins."
The multiplicity and cleverness of reason to shadow the one
religious understanding of the occasion finds expression in 
the third Edifying Discourse:
Thus is it not true that the guilty may be the 
occasion for the destruction of the innocent?
But is not the opposite equally, true? Perhaps then 
the understanding lacked only the courage to be­
lieve this, and while it had sufficient distressing 
cleverness to discover the wretchedness of life, it 
did not have the courage to apprehend the power of 
love. Is this not true? For the reason still
merely makes a man despondent and faint-hearted,
but love gives courage freely, and because of this
43 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 63.
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every apostolic word is always confident. ' '
This passage attempts much. It denies to the rational begin­
nings of Hegelian and Kantian philosophy an opening to explain 
life as expressed in an apostolic word. It posits love as a 
power not totally determined by man's own effort, thus estab­
lishing the understanding of love not in the "overman" of 
Neitzsche but in the confident framework of an apostolic ut­
terance. It abandons all Pelegian efforts, not into the business 
of corrective doubt but into the despairing guise of despondency 
and faint-heartedness. The reality of both the infinite and 
the finite is again witnessed in a testimony to their distinc­
tion. Apostolic love and romantic love are two occasions not
45relatively distinct but absolutely distinct.
In the fifth Edifying Discourse entitled "Strengthened in 
the Inner Man" S^ren Kierkegaard considers how the occasion is 
to be used in relation to the religious. Johannes de Silentio 
has described the movements of the Knight of Faith in two steps.
The first step (as far as the Knight of Infinite Resignation 
goes) is to renounce the occasions of earthly concern. For the 
Knight of Faith another step must be taken, the entire human 
activity must be overcome and itself become the occasion for 
strengthening the inner man. Although Johannes de Silentio can­
not yet make this step, in the fifth Edifying Discourse is found
44 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 85.
45 Or what has a believer in common with an unbeliever?
What agreement has the temple of God with the idols? Cor. 6:15-16.
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a highly favored man blessed with prosperity who nevertheless 
is a Knight of Faith and is described at the hour of death like 
this:
♦..but when in the stillness of the night the call 
comes: "Bender an accounting for your stewardship,"
then he knows what this summons means; he knows how 
the account stands, and even if there is something 
lacking, he confidently quits the world of thought 
and action, which still had not possessed his soul; 
abandons the elaborately complex and extensive labor, 
which from day to day had furnished him the occasion 
for strengthening the inner man.46
Regarding the occasion in this fashion enables the understand­
ing to witness life's movements not as if bound to explain 
the occasion in terms of its own exhaustive phenomenology (as 
if the occasion could exist in such a fashion except in despair), 
but rather to understand the occasion in terms of the Infinite 
apart from which there are only appearances.
So whether you eat or drink or whatever you do, 
do all to the glory of God.47
46 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 118.
47 I Cor. 10:31.
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Chapter 3» Either/Or .
So I make plans like a worldly map, 
ready to say yes and no at o n c e . 4°
Kierkegaard’s ironic use of either/or is taken from Socrates
The intensive use of this expression draws its strength from the
quest for the infinite by means of the negative.
No, it is a Socrates who relishes the play of light 
and shadow entailed in a syllogistic aut-aut, when 
almost at the same instant appear the noontide of 
day and the pitch black of night, the infinitely 
real and infinite n o t h i n g n e s s . 49
There is a similarity of intensity in this concept as there was 
in the concept of the moment. The reason for incorporating 
such a term as either/or is to enable the conception of exist­
ence to escape becoming systematized and reduced to logical 
necessity. The passionate freedom existing within either/or 
far outweighs for Kierkegaard, the determined mediation of 
Hegel's system. By using either/or the reader is forced to 
choose between Socrates and Hegel. If speculative philosophy 
is possible in its mediation then either/or is insignificant.
And if either/or is possible, speculation is ridiculous.
Either/or as a category of existence for Kierkegaard was 
absolutely opposed to mediation. And yet either/or was es­
sential, if man was to be open to the possibility of religion. 
Understood in relation to mediation or speculative philosophy,
48 II Cor. 1:18.
49 Concept of Irony, p. 117.
51
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either/or could be seen only in its absolute negativity. Even 
though disenchanted by Hegelian mediation either/or leaves a 
man starving like the hungry donkey between two hay stacks.
The advantage of either/or over mediation resides in the fact 
that in the case of either/or at least the stacks of hay are 
real and the donkey is actually starving!
It is not the purpose of Authors A and B to win the 
reader either to accepting the aesthetic or the ethical, but 
rather to point out the negativity of the either/or stance.
For as Kierkegaard illustrates, it is not he who chooses either 
this or that, but he who becomes an either/or that understands 
the meaning of Either/Or. If one simply chose an either/or 
that choice itself could be mediated forward. It was the pur­
pose of Kierkegaard to show man precisely as he was. Only by 
becoming an either/or was man able to see clearly where religion 
did not lie. Otherwise, man would continue on with the business 
of Christendom regarding religion as he did the other words 
mediated within the system of speculative philosophy.
Similar to the word moment and its development into the 
concept of the instant Kierkegaard develops the term either/or 
into the concept of fear and trembling. Initially either/or 
is seen in its relation to Socratic irony. Once the negativity 
of either/or gives way to a positive expression the more im­
portant concept of fear and trembling is born. This is not to 
deny the place of either/or in Kierkegaard's authorship. Rather 
it points out that as Kierkegaard begins to confront the pseu­
donymous writers with the religious, something other than the
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ironic expression of either/or is needed, When Johannes de 
Silentio studies Abraham it becomes obvious that something 
other than either/or is demanded.
As is the case throughout the aesthetic stage of Kierke­
gaard's authorship the understanding of pseudonymous vocabulary 
becomes plain in the Edifying Discourses. Having been exhausted 
by the irony of Author A and Author B, S^ren Kierkegaard seeks 
to edify in his discourses. The entire mood has been changed, 
the absolute negativity of either/or and its constant motion 
from this vein to that is abruptly done away within the dis­
courses where faith and not irony take command.
50It is true that he who expects something in par­
ticular may be disappointed; but this does not 
happen to the believer...he still says: "There
is an expectation which all the world can not 
take from me; it is the expectation of faith and 
this is victory...my expectation was not in the 
world but in God.51
The pseudonymous category of either/or has been radically
overcome in the eternity of faith, that faith which edifies!
50 Some either of this or some of that, or even of having 
this either/or.
51 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 39.
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Chapter 4. Fear and Trembling
Fear and trembling come upon me,
and horror overwhelms me. e-p
And I say, "0 that I had wings like a dove!"
As a religious expression fear and trembling is a more 
traditionally understandable conception than either/or or 
repetition. In Johannes de Silentio's book of that same title 
fear and trembling is seen in relation to Abraham's act of 
faith.
I know now that you fear God, since you have not 
withheld your only son from me.53
In the hands of the non-Hegelian Johannes de Silentio fear
and trembling is used to point out that true religious faith
possesses a quality entirely different from any other human
experience. The paradoxical fear and trembling of faith is
absolutely distinct from the mediations of Hegelian philosophy,
the poetic passion of Shakespere, the demands of the universal
on the particular or the immediacy of aestheticism.
Johannes de Silentio is producing an entire book just to
let the faithful conception of fear and trembling stand firm
54in its traditional usage. No progress in humanity, culture,
52 Psalms 55:5-6.
53 Genesis 22:12.
54 And I was with you in weakness and in much fear and 
trembling; and my speech and my message were not in plausible 
words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and power, 
that your faith might not rest in the wisdom of men but in the 
power of God. I Cor. 2:3-5.
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or philosophy will ever take fear and trembling from the act of
faith. If a man ever arrives at that point where his faith is
essentially different from that experienced by Abraham he will
have allowed the paradoxical and passionate nature of faith to
be replaced by something else. Reflecting on that faith which
so far he has not chosen, Johannes de Silentio states that
it is impossible to find anything more passionate than the
act of faith, and that any talk of going beyond faith is simply
another way of refusing to accept it for what it is.
In our time nobody is content to stop with faith but 
wants to go further. It would perhaps be rash to 
ask where these people are going, but it is surely 
a sign of breeding and culture for me to assume that 
everybody has faith, for otherwise it would be queer 
for them to be...going further.55
In choosing the sub-title "a dialectical lyric" to the 
book title Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard allows the interest­
ed, though yet unbelieving Johannes de Silentio to reflect on 
the religious conception of fear and trembling. It is obvious 
that fear and trembling could be the subject of a religiously 
edifying discourse, but such a book could not be written by 
the non-believing Johannes de Silentio. By placing Johannes 
de Silentio in a dialectically lyrical relationship to the 
fear and trembling of faith, Kierkegaard has taken the non­
believer one step further along the way in showing him pre­
cisely where he is. For within the book Fear and Trembling 
the author sees clearly the difference between his lyrical 
regard for faith, and Abraham who in fear and trembling chose 
to believe. As an apologist Kierkegaard was aware that he
55 Fear and Trembling, p. 23.
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could not force faith on to another, but rather only make
clear the difference between believing and not believing.
Johannes de Silentio can only be negatively interested in
faith since he only regards it lyrically.
I am convinced that God is love, this thought 
has for me a primitive lyrical validity.5°
The lyrical apprehension of faith, however, is not the
same as giving up the possibility of faith or abandoning it to
some necessary category within a logical system. Johannes de
Silentio is better off than the Hegelian members of Christendom
in that he is still able to will to believe since he has not
ruled out the possibility beforehand. Yet Johannes is in
despair to the degree that he wills to remain where he is.
By putting this entire discussion in the hands of lyrical
minded Johannes de Silentio Kierkegaard saves his apologetic
from becoming pleased with its recognition of the fact that
Abraham's fear and trembling is different than other human
experience. As soon as the clarifying stage of apologetics
becomes a substitute for faith itself, then apologetics destroys
the possibility of faith and is no longer an apologetic but
rather a negative force acting in despair against belief.
Whereas Hegelianized Christianity seeks to go beyond fear 
and trembling not realizing that by doing such it has become 
anti-Christian, Johannes de Silentio at least distinguishes 
between fear and trembling as a lyrical expression and as an 
essential increment of faith.
56 Fear and Trembling, p. 45.
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But the highest passion in a man is faith, and
here no generation begins at any other point than
did the preceding generation, every generation 
begins all over again, the subsequent generation 
gets no further than the foregoing— in so far as 
this remained faithful to its task and did not 
leave it in the lurch.
It is only when man goes beyond the either/or stance in 
relation to time and human activity that he stands in re­
lation to fear and trembling. Pear and trembling is the faith­
ful category that belongs to Abraham, either/or is the category 
of infinite resignation that belongs to Socrates. The advantage 
of becoming an either/or, however, does not positively destroy 
the possibility of fear and trembling but simply regards the
passion of believing in an absolutely negative fashion. Only
a man of faith experiences fear and trembling.
The words of the pseudonymous authors cannot in any positive
58manner edify the reader. Yet with the writing of Johannes 
de Silentio the fear and trembling of the believer stands apart 
from the other expressions of human activity. On the other 
hand, the writing of S^ren Kierkegaard does edify because in 
his discourses it is assumed that the reader adready is a
believer and already has begun not with the wisdom of men but
50
with the wisdom of God. J
57 Pear and Trembling, p. 130.
58 'For the kingdom of God does not consist in talk but in 
power." I Cor. 4:20.
59 But if you have bitter jealously and selfish ambition in 
your hearts, do not boast and be false to the truth. This wisdom 
is not such as comes down from above, but is earthly, unspiritual 
devilish... But the wisdom from above is first pure then peace­
able, gentle, open to reason, full of mercy and good fruits, with 
out uncertainty or insincerity." James 3:14...17.
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When either/or is converted into fear and trembling some­
thing other than the finite self becomes the measure of man.
It is not until man escapes the despair of regarding all things 
in relation to himself only that he is able to define himself 
religiously. When a personality becomes an either/or it is 
so absorbed in the strife of self-idenity that it never be­
comes more than a shadow of itself in motion. When fear and 
trembling enter the personality the constant dialectic of 
being either "this" or "that" is overcome. The negativity of 
either/or is abandoned as the personality in fear and trembling 
relates itself to the Infinite. The self-directed despair of 
becoming an either/or is left behind and replaced by the ac­
cepted willingness of a becoming in fear and trembling.
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Part III
The Relationship of the Future 
to the Possibility of Repetition
Chapter 1. The Future
So let no one boast of men. For all things are yours, 
whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas or the world or life 
or death or the present or the future, all are yours.1
The first Edifying Discourse, entitled "The Expectation of 
Faith" is written to be read on New Year’s Day when everyone is 
thinking particularly about the inscrutable possibilities involved 
in the future.
As the number of those who expect something always con­
stitutes the majority of the world, so too their 
expectations can be so various that it is very difficult 
to mention all of them. Yet all of them have one expec­
tation in common, that they all expect some future.^
One wonders how various people come to regard the future. Is
the future simply the past remembered forward? Does one find
himself building the future on those joyful or sorrowful moments
which have already taken place? On the other hand can one only
be "enslaved like the beasts, his head bent toward the earth,
his soul ensnared in the service of the moment?"3 If there is
only the present, what is there of man that differentiates him
1 I Cor. 3:21-22
2 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 31.
3 Ibid.
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from the other animals? The future then cannot be regarded as 
the past put into the service of tomorrow. Nor can it be the 
present. If the future were the present there could be no ex­
pectation. In the finite order of time one cannot expect what 
one has.
The tendency of the Romantic poet to view the future as 
the past, is well expressed by Author A in his introductory re­
frains :
An so it is with me: always before me an empty
space; what drives me.forward is a consistency 
which lies behind me.
These words reflect Kierkegaard's continual insistence that
German Romanticism never breaks the bonds of its own reflective
poetry. Author A begins and ends imprisoned within his own
poetic reflections. The Romanticist for Kierkegaard is incapable
of expressing the future, but simply echos again and again the
past. The reflective man could never say what S^ren Kierkegaard
says initially in the first Edifying Discourse:
The past is completed; the present is not; only the 
future is, which yet is n o t . 5
Compare this to Author A's consideration of hope:
I can describe hope so vividly that every hoping 
individual will acknowledge my description; and 
yet it is a deception, for while I picture hope,
I think of memory.°
4 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 24.
5 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 23.
6 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 35.
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In "The Ancient Tragical Motif As Reflected in the Modern"1 
Author A, after showing that the modern idea of the tragical is 
reflective anxiety and so is essentially different than the
Q
Greek concept of sorrow, says:
In addition, anxiety always involves a reflection 
upon time, for I cannot he anxious about the present, 
but only about the past or the future; but the past ’ 
and the future so resisting one another that theq 
present vanishes, are reflective determinations.
In so far as the future is regarded as a reflective category, 
it can only probe around about the future or posit the whole 
future in the present moment, yet so that the present moment 
instantly dissolves in succession. It is clear that Author A
cannot break into the real, but again must return to his re­
flection of the past.
Author B reviews the case of Author A concerning the future 
with great passion:
You turn towards the future, for action is always
futuristic. You say, "I can either do this or do
that, but whichever of the two I do is equally mad, 
ergo I do nothing at all.
The point being made here is that either the word future means
something other than the past under another form, or the future
7 The title of the second chapter of Sither/Or, Vol. I.
8 But since in order to experience sorrow, the tragic guilt
must have this vagueness, so reflection must not be present in its 
infinitude, for then it would reflect her out of her guilt, because 
reflection in its infinite subjectivity cannot let the element of 
inherited guilt remain, which causes the sorrow. (Either/Or,
Vol. I, p. 152.)
9 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 153.
10 Either/Or, Vol. II, p. 174.
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and the past are identified. ‘The later is precisely what Author
B is condemning Author A for. For if the future and the past
are simply the same thing under different names, whether Author
A wishes to "do nothing at all" or whether he wishes to play
with words regarding them once as the future and then once as
the past, doesn’t really matter at all. The whole matter has
fallen under the shadow of subjectivism.
Carrying the discussion further Author B points out the
inability of philosophy to answer the question about the future.
Now I assume that philosophy is in the right, that 
the principle of contradiction really is annulled, 
or that the philosophers transcend it every instant 
in the higher unity which exists for thought. This 
however, surely cannot hold with respect to the future, 
for the oppositions must first be in existence before 
I can mediate them. But if the oppositions are there, 
then there must be an either/or. The philosopher says, 
"That’s the way it’s been hitherto." I ask, "What am 
I to do if I do not want to be a philosopher?"H
Again the future is to be found in the past. The Romantic poet 
and the Hegelian philosopher have lost any real contact with the 
future because they have failed to notice the ideality-in-the- 
past of their reflections.
What can only be reflected out of the past by the poet and 
what can only be mediated and mediated and mediated by the phi­
losopher as the future is caste aside in the Edifying Discourses:
Through the eternal can one conquer the future, because 
the eternal is the foundation of the future; therefore 
through this one can understand that. What then is the 
eternal power in man? It is faith...The believer is 
therefore done with the future before he begins on the
Either/Or, Vol. II, p. 175. Relating this statement 
to the overall apologetic of Kierkegaard, the reader might well 
ask the question, "What am I to do if I do not want to be a 
theologian?"
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present; for what one has conquered no longer has power 
to disturb one, and this victory can only make one more 
powerful for the present.12
What has become of reflection? It has lost its place of romantic 
importance. Anxiety over the future has been overcome by faith. 
By a faithful look at the future the author of the "Expectation 
of Faith" has inverted the modern preoccupations with reflective 
subjectivity by refusing to accept them in the beginning."^
If Hegelian philosophy is concerned with the real, and as 
such is more than a system of thought, then the future as medi­
ated in that philosophy stands of itself and "the expectation of 
faith" can only be an appendage added to it or mediated from it. 
On the other hand if the future in Hegelian philosophy is con­
cerned with the past to such a degree that.the future is nothing 
other than past re-stated, then the future as "the expectation of 
faith" is an entirely different matter which in letters only 
resembles the future as mediated.
The understanding of faith presented by S^ren Kierkegaard 
enables one to regard much eschatological talk as a preoccupation 
concerned with reflective categories. No matter how preoccupied 
one becomes in regard to the future, or how poetically satis­
fied one wishes to see the future, the future for Sj^ren Kierke­
gaard can be had only through faith and this faith can be had only
through being constantly developed. In no way can a person get
12 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 34.
13 For S^ren Kierkegaard and for the Christian, "In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word 
was God." John 1:1.
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beyond the future, and in no way can a person mediate to the 
future. The future is united to the infinite and can only be 
witnessed in man at that point where ideality and actuality merge. 
This is the place where consciousness is relationship. The man­
ifold theories of subjectivism can be extensively reflected in 
the thought world of ideality, but they cannot touch actuality 
except in the consciousness of man.
Eeflection is the mere disinterested process of set­
ting thing against thing in collision. Consciousness 
is the place where this process takes place; indeed 
it is the energizing force behind the process. There 
alone doubt can reside. And consciousness is not 
disinterested. '4
Nor can finite considerations get beyond themselves. For 
continually they are condemned to the moment of their expression. 
Something other than a series of finite moments is needed to 
understand the future. For the author of "The Expectation of 
Faith" the future regarded solely in its finitude is a dangerous 
enemy.
He who fights with the future has a more dangerous 
enemy, he can never remain ignorant about himself; 
for he fights with himself. The future is not; it 
borrows its strength from the man himself, and when 
it has tricked him out of this, then it appears out­
side of him as the enemy he must meet. Let a man 
then be as strong as he will, no man is stronger 
than himself.15
How then for Soren Kierkegaard is a man to be armed for the con­
flict with the future? He immediately dismissed the commonly
14 S^ren Kierkegaard. Johannes Climacus or, De Omnibus Dubi- 
tandum Est and A Sermon, translated by T. II. Crox&ll, L. L. 
(Stanford, 1967), P* ’HT!.
15 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 32.
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approved defenders, as Job did his "friends." Experience as a 
friend has a double tongue, guessing is a deceitful guide, sup­
position is a vague glance and conclusion is a sling where a man 
more often catches himself than the other.^ Imagine what would 
happen to modern man if these four "friends of the finite" lost
their "infinite gloss." And yet as long as man is content to 
17rotate these ideas intensively and extensively so as to keep
1 fi
busily away from "Him without whom was not anything made,"
the future remains determined and boring in the past.
The only understanding of the future which S^ren Kierkekaard
treats as real is that which expects victory. This entire matter
is in the hands of faith and the future which edifies is the
future of the believer.
And today on the first day of the year, when the 
thought about the future thrusts itself upon me,
I will not satiate my soul with various expecta­
tions, nor dissipate it in manifold ideas; I will 
rally it, and, sound and happy, if possible, go 
forth to meet the future. It brings what it will 
and must bring; many expectations disappointed, 
many fulfilled, so it will happen, as experience 
has taught me; but there is an expectation which 
will not be dissappointed; experience has not iq 
taught expectation of faith, and this is victory. ^
16 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 37.
17 "The Rotation Method" was the title of the 
chapter of Either/Or, Vol. I. It is also the place where 
Kierkegaard"first begins to develop the concept which will 
eventually be called "Repetition."
18 John 1:3
19 Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. Aq.
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Chapter 2. Repetition
Jesus answered, "Amen, amen, I say to thee, unless 
a man be born again of water and the g^irit, he 
cannot enter into the kingdom of God. ^
Like most of Kierkegaard's aesthetic vocabulary, repetition
receives its initial exposition in Sither/Or.
...only sensuous love, in terms of its very concept, 
is essentially faithless. But this, its faithless­
ness, appears also in another wav* it becomes in 
fact only a constant repetition.^•
This faithlessness which becomes repetition is precisely that 
form of faithless sensuousness which, while in pursuit of momen­
tary pleasure, allows the personality to be overcome by boredom. 
Author A does not let the matter rest here. He hopes to save 
the personality this boredom. In Mozart's Lon Juan sensuous 
faithlessness is not mediated into language. As soon as the 
listener holds the immediate sensuousness of Mozart's Lon Juan 
firm (mediates the musical Lon Juan into the idea of Don Juan) 
Don Juan vanishes. Repetition of faithless sensuousness into 
the category of boredom is impossible within the immediacy of 
Mozart's Don Juan.
Along the same lines of preserving aesthetical immediacy, 
Author A records an essay on social prudence: "The Rotation
20 John 3:5. "Unless a man be born anothen" The Greek 
another has the double meaning of "from abore" and "again."
(hew Testament Readier Guide, commentary by Raymond Brown
[ C o irig r“fn 7 7  1113537; '“Tib577 0 . 26.)
21 Sltner/Or, Vol* i , o. 33*
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Method."2  ^ In this essay the socially prudent man learns to
cleverly control all pleasure so as not to become bored with
its charms. By shrewdly manipulating the various moments of
pleasure Author A hopes to overcome the ennui of repetition.
No moment must be permitted so great a significance 
that it cannot be forgotten when convenient; each 
moment ought however, to have so much significance 
that it can be recollected at will.23
Author A praises the art of remembering and forgetting in their 
role of "insuring against sticking fast in some relationships 
of life, and making possible the realization of a complete free­
dom."2^ On the other hand Author A warns against friendship 
and even more so marriage. The reason being that "the essential
thing is never to stick fast, and for this it is necessary to
25have oblivion back of one." The whole secret of' this shrewd 
repetition lies in arbitrariness. The person confined to this 
stage must be willing to transform something accidental into the 
absolute, and as such into the object of his admiration.
The immediate sensuousness of Mozart's Don Juan is a more 
delicate investigation of the aesthetic than is the shrewdness 
of "The Rotation Method." The first deals with the basic aes­
thetic notion of erotic senuousness as expressed in the musical.
22 See footnote number 17» Part III, p. 65,
23 Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 289.
24 Ibid., p. 291.
25 Ibid., p. 292.
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The second deals with man's manipulation of senuous pleasure 
when located outside the musical. Kierkegaard's most complete 
presentation of this position comes in the "Diary of a Seducer." 
The discussion of Mozart's Don Juan is directed toward those 
modem European aesthetes who were yet aware of the graceful 
beauty of Greek aestheticism. "The Rotation Method" was more 
concerned to speak to the quasi-aesthetic personality whose 
involvement with the "beautiful" was not free from the sticky 
fingers of modem pragmatism.
Author B sees the matter differently. For him, if repeti­
tion is impossible, the possibility of ethics is forever abandoned.
26By its very nature ethics is related to the universal and not 
to immediate sensuousness. Nearly the entire production of 
Author B is consumed in the effort to defend the aesthetic valid­
ity of marriage. (granted its -unchanging ethical structure) 
Directing himself to Author A, Author B states:
It is no wonder you are alarmed and that you associate 
these signs and "gesticulations" with things of which 
one dare not say decies repetita placebunt; for if 
that which gives them value was the characteristic 
qualification "the first time," a repetition is indeed 
impossible. But healthy love has an entirely different 
worth; it is in time it accomplishes its work, and 
therefore, it will be capable of rejuvenation itself 
by means of these outward signs, and (what to me is the 
principal thing) it has an entirely different conception 
of time and the significance of repetition.27
The reader of Either/Or is left with two alternatives, or as
26 The relation of ethics to the universal is taken up 
again at length in Fear and Trembling.
27 Either/Or,"Vol. II, p. 144.
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2 8Kierkegaard, puts it, "he becomes an either/or." The sensuous
immediacy of Mozart's Don Juan or marriage? The immediacy of
Don Juan escapes the ethical constancy of marriage. Marriage
is left in boredom if sensuous immediacy is absent. This is as
far as Authors A and B can go. The ironic disembodiment of the
Hegelian categories is again obvious. Any hope of mediating the
aesthetic as immediate sensuousness and the aesthetic viewed
ethically into the category of marriage is impossible.
Up to this point Kierkegaard has not fully intuited the
concept of repetition which is to be the theme of Constantius*
book. So far, repetition is defined more in accord with the
29common designation. That is, in relation to "the first,"
boredom, and time. Not until Kierkegaard begins Johannes
Climacus Or, Do Omnibus Dubitandum Est-^ does the concept of
repetition begin to blossom into its own.
It is when Ideality and Reality-^1 (i.e. Actuality) 
are put into contact with each other that Repetition 
appears. When, for example, I see something "in the 
moment," Ideality intervenes and explains that it is 
a repetition. There is opposition here, because that 
which was existing, exists again in another manner.
That this outward object exists, that I can see. But
28 Bither/Or, Vol. II, p. 161.
29 Although not discussed in this essay "the first" is an 
important category both in Either/Or (Chapter six, Vol. I, is 
entitled "The First Love.") and in the Edifying Discourses. 
(Especially in Vol. I, the last paragraph of the fifth Discourse 
"Blessed the man who can truly say: God in heaven was my first
love." P. 129)
30 This work was never completed. It was begun In 1g 42.
31 In the sense that immediacy is reality.
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at the same time I bring it into relationship with 
something else which also exists, something which is 
the same too. Here is a twofoldness, one resembling-^ 
the other. Here we can r i g h t l y  speak of Repetition,
When actuality is seen "in the moment" or as "history repeats 
itself," it is not seen as tempered by "Ideality." Left un­
tempered, actuality finds itself lost in the ambiguousness of 
human experience.
For experience as a friend has a double tongue which 
says now one thing, now another; and guessing is a 
deceitful guide who deserts one when one needs him 
most, and the supposition is a vague glance which 
does not look very far, and the conclusion is a sling 
wherein a man more often catches himself than the 
other. In addition, those weapons are difficult to 
use; for with guessing goes fear, with conjecture 
apprehension, with the conclusion disquiet, since 
the questing soul does not remain unmoved by the 
experience.33
On the other hand how does Ideality (Eternity) help to ex­
plain repetition present within man’s finite existence?
Eternity [Ideality] does not participate in this 
contingency, [of actuality]. It is: unchangeable,
"necessary" (opposite of contingent), permanent.
Obviously there can be no repetition in a sphere 
which cannot change or admit of new factors.34
Whereas actuality is regarded as totally submerged in the moment,
Eternity can of itself have nothing to do with this time-bound
actuality. Apparently repetition is impossible. Time presents
an unending series of unrelated moments. Ideality (Eternity)
remains aloof in its timeless unchangeableness.
3
P. &K-
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In solving this diLemma of repetition Kierkegaard is aware 
of three historical positions. Closest at hand is the solution 
of German romanticism. According to this mode of thinking, 
existence is apparently left open to freedom (away from boredom) 
by establishing the present and the future in an ’’echoed" re­
lationship to the past. An attempt to make the present and the 
future distinct from the past and yet dependent on the past is 
a common feature of German romanticism. There exists a hidden 
reductionism in romanticism which defines everything in relation 
to something that is assumed to be present in the past. Roman­
ticism seeks out the historical in existence, makes that the 
subject of its art and by using language well, hopes to convert 
the historical on its own merit into a trans-historical impor­
tance. Again the attempt on the part of German Romanticism to 
mediate the finite into the infinite is made obvious.
Socrates has another solution. He begins his investigation 
of human freedom in relation to Ideality. This process is re­
ferred to as Recollection.
The error of the Sophist is in seeking to arrogate 
something to man; the Socratic, on the other hand, in 
denying in every sense that virtue can be taught.
Hence it is obvious that this Socratic conception is 
negative: it negates life, development, in short,
history in its most universal and widest sense. The 
Sophist negates original history, Socrates subsequent 
history.— If we next inquire to what more universal 
consideration this Socratic view must be referred, 
in what totality it reposes, then it obviously has the 
significance attributed to recollection. Recollection 
is retrograde development, however, and hence the re­
flected image of development in the strict sense...
The Socratic approach, on the other hand, is to get 
the whole of actuality disaffirmed, and then refer man­
kind to a recollection that recedes further and further
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toward a past itself receding as far back in time 
as the origin of that noble family which no one
can remember.35
In the case of German Romanticism the present is exhausted in 
relation to the past. Thus reducing all human experience to 
the level of historical relationship. Socrates also regards 
the present in light of the past. Yet in the case of Socrates 
the present is not exhausted in its relation to the past but 
rather the present stands in an ironical relationship to the 
past which is a relationship of infinite comparing and reject­
ing. This ironic understanding of existence brought to light 
in Socrates is well illustrated in the dialogue of grotagoras.
...the negative lies in the always necessarily 
and inherently fatal dissatisfaction of an in­
finite empiricism, the irony in the 'bon appetit!', 
so to speak, which Socrates wishes Protagoras.3°
Socrates escapes an interpretation of existence which rests 
momentarily in the finite-historical. Though negative in nature, 
the concept of Socratic irony remains open to the possibility 
of the infinite. Such an openness is demanded of any language 
which is to be called religious (or apologetic).
The third position is that of Christianity. Here human 
freedom exists in the instantaneous presence of time and etern­
ity. When temporal existence is realized anew in this instan­
taneous presence of time and eternity that repetition is born 
which is the title and subject of Constantine Constantius' book.
35 The Concept of Irony, p. 97.
36 Ibid., p. 98.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Constantius begins by pointing out the difference between
hope, recollection and repetition:
Hope is a new garment, starched and stiff and glit­
tering, yet one has never had it on, and hence one 
does not know how it will become one and how it 
fits. Hecollection is a discarded garment, which 
beautiful as it may be, does not fit, for one has 
outgrown it. Repetition is an imperishable garment, 
which fits snugly and confortably, neither too tight 
nor too loose. Hope is a charming maiden but slips 
through the fingers, recollection is a beautiful 
old woman but of no use at the instant, repetition 
is a beloved wife of whom one never tires.37
Without calling up Christianity to present its own case (Con­
stantius being quite unable to do such, not being a man of faith) 
Constantius expresses concern for a positive principle of human 
freedom which asserts something other than a relationship to the 
past. Further he desires a new word which will describe to 
rational man what it is to be open to the future in such a way 
as to somehow escape the negativity of Greek recollection. Such 
a word he discovers is repetition. The hidden truth of the mat­
ter is that such a word, though found on the lips of the a- 
religious Constantius, depends from beginning to end upon a 
positive principle within religion. Not until the end of the 
book does Constantius see the religious nature of the entire in­
vestigation. Initially in a Pelagian attire Constantius dis­
cusses the matter as if on his own he could resolve it. But 
having fled up and down the labyrinthine ways of his own mind, 
Constantius finally admits of the religious starting point of 
his searching.
37 Repetition, p. 34.
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As was often the case with Kierkegaard's publications, 
Repetition was well received but for the wrong reasons. The 
most serious level of concern present within the book was gen­
erally disregarded. Finally after one prominent Danes' review 
Constantine Constantius is driven to compose a fifty-five page 
reply. "A Little Plea" by Constantine Constantius, author of 
Repetition finds repetition in three forms: repetition (A) in
relation to pleasure; repetition (B) in relation to shrewdness; 
repetition (C) in relation to freedom itself. This third form 
is the matter of the work Repetition, even though the author, 
Constantius, goes a considerable way to point out psychologi­
cally how in the case of this repetition (C) one is deceived 
by repetition (A) and (B).
Repetition (A). Freedom first is defined as pleasure or in 
pleasure. What it now fears is repetition. It is as if repe­
tition possessed a magic power to hold freedom captive when 
once it had contrived to get it under its influence. Yet in 
spite of all the inventiveness of pleasure repetition makes its 
appearance. At this stage, the psychological "moment" of plea­
sure is let stand for what it is. In so far as each moment of 
pleasure condemns a man to that particular moment alone, all 
hope of continuity of life vanishes and pleasure falls into de­
spair. There is a fear of repetition present, but it is not 
repetition (C). Repetition at this stage is of that kind which 
finds man wishing pleasure to last forever when he is fully 
aware that every pleasurable moment is precisely pleasurable 
because of its definite time limit. A personality defined in
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relation to "pleasure-moment" despairs of itself in that it 
chooses to be closed off from any relation with Ideality or 
Eternity.
Repetition (B). Here freedom is defined as shrewdness.
Repetition is assumed to exist, but it is the task 
of freedom to see constantly a new side of repeti­
tion. .. However, since freedom defined as shrewd­
ness is only finitely characterized, repetition must 
again make its appearance, that is repetition of the 
trick by ' ' ‘ ' ’ ts to delude repetition
In repetition (A) pleasure is itself seen in the desperate 
moment.
There are well-known insects which die in the 
moment of fecundation. So it is with all joy; 
life's supreme and richest moment of pleasure is 
coupled with death.39
The relation of one pleasurable moment to another is left aside. 
In repetition (B) the shrewd manipulations of finite moments 
are themselves found to be in despair. Finally repetition (A) 
and (B) are found wanting for the same reason. In either case 
human experience is found lost in the momentary satisfaction of 
the finite and closed off to the infinite.
Repetition (C) is another kind. At this point freedom does 
not seek pleasure or shrewdness, but repetition itself. Realiz­
ing that repetition (A) and (B) of themselves cannot reconcile 
life's moments in any real way, freedom wishes to keep repetition 
rather as a means for justifying itself, that is, for making
38 Repetition, p. 12.
and make
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freedom possible.
In case it should come about that freedom in the 
individual, related as it is to the environment, 
might remain, so to speak, lying in the result, 
so that it cannot withdraw (repeat itself), then
all is lost. So then what freedom now fears is
not repetition but change, what it wills is not
change but repetition.4°
Whereas repetition (A) and (B) were finally condemned to the 
finitude of the pleasurable moment and shrewdness, freedom 
itself calls for repetition (C) to keep itself free. If free­
dom is to be present in the individual, repetition must be
possible in order to enable freedom to escape the determinism 
of the moment.
The Kierkegaardian dialectic is hard at work. Repetition 
(A) and (B) destroy freedom as reflected in pleasure and shrewd­
ness. Repetition (G) is demanded by Treedom as reflected in 
'freedom itself. Repetition (A) and (B) are not mediated into 
a third higher repetition. Either the assumptions of repetition 
(A) and (B) are true, and so freedom is impossible, or repetition 
(C) is possible and repetition (A) and (B) are seen as categories 
of despair. Constantius uses repetition (A) and (B) to deceive 
the reader into accepting an interest in repetition (C).
Finally freedom in the individual is possible only if 
repetition (C) is possible. And yet, repetition (C) is neither 
the product of, nor in accord with repetition (A) and (B).
Then when Stoicism has stepped aside there remains 
only the religious movement as the true expression
40 Repetition, p. 12.
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of repetition, and in its strife it announces itself ... 
with the passionate eloquence of the anxious freedom.
Constantine Constantius cannot deal with repetition (C). That 
is not his concern. He is simply searching modern culture to 
see how it handles such a problem outside the religious category 
of faith. Constantius winds up disconcerted and empty handed.
At the deepest level of existence his culture was unable to pro­
vide the necessary vocabulary. Constantius finds himself in a 
state similar to Hegel in Hegel's imagined dialogue with 
Socrates.
Socrates:
Hegel: 
Socrates: 
Hegel: 
Socrates:
Hegel:
Shall we begin by being in complete dis­
agreement, or shall we agree about a thing 
we might call a presupposition?
(silent)
7/hat presupposition do you begin with?
With none at all.
Splendid! Then I suppose you do not begin 
at all?
I not begin, who have written twenty-one
volumes?^
41 Repetition, pp. 12-13.
42 J. 552 (VI.A. 145) Cited in Johannes Climacus, p. 61.
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Part IV
Concluding Repetition
For the word of the cross is folly to those who 
are perishing, hut to us who are being saved it 
is the power of God.
In staging the problem of how one is to become a Christian 
Kierkegaard has looked carefully both at the Christian and at 
the non-believer. The believer is noted for his passionate wil­
lingness to believe, to live, to suffer and to be happy. The 
unbeliever is bored. As an apologist Kierkegaard is concerned 
mainly with the Christian happiness as it stands over against 
boredom. Whether one is faithfully happy or unbelievably bored 
depends in large part on how one regards his time. Thus the 
initial thrust of Kierkegaard's aesthetic authorship is con­
cerned with the time bound moment.
Kierkegaard is suggesting that if we take a close look 
around us boredom consists in a disproportionate ordering of 
time. There is a time to go to work, a time to read the news­
paper, a time to eat, a time to watch television, a time to 
recreate, a time to have children, a time to drink beer, a time 
to make love, a time to be born, a time to go to church, a time 
to read more books, a time to go to school, a time to get mar­
ried, a time to think, and finally a time to die. The entire
1 I Cor. 1:18.
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life span of man is filled with moments of clock-caic.ulated 
activity. The happy life, in terms of technological society, 
is the full life. Advertizing soaks the imagination with this 
idea, psychology illustrates the necessity of keeping this 
notion of time equitably balanced, education helps everyone 
realize this fact, sociology showers it on to the less for­
tunate, and "theology" sanctifies this notion.
Suppose that life, packaged out in these time-bound moments, 
was to become boring? Suppose that the pursuit of time-bound 
pleasure was explicitly proven to be boring. Suppose that 
the poor man didn’t seek out the pleasurable moments of the mid­
dle class and the middle class forgot for an instant to be in­
fatuated with the splendid use of time projected by the upper 
class. Suppose that happiness didn't depend in any way on more 
money, a better job, better education, a secure future or even 
talk about these things. Suppose that the entire super-structure 
of modern culture could be proven to be boring. Who would be­
lieve it? Who has the time for such a thought?
Kierkegaard looked around and saw Copenhagen as busy and 
bored. Wow since part of this time-bound activity included 
going to church, and in writing MA theses in theology surely 
religion is just as busy and just as boring as the rest of 
culture. In fact it appeared that theology was the busiest and 
most boring activity of all, since it was supposed, by some, to 
be at the center of things. Kierkegaard saw Christendom to be 
a busy, pluralistic, unhappy, ambiguous moment of boredom,
2 Could this be an adequate definition of Worth American 
theology?
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Now a man who saw what Kierkegaard saw could quit going to 
church and begin to look around for his soul. The average man, 
however, was not so fortunate. He is so lost in his moments- 
of-time that he either doesn't recognize this state of boredom 
and so remains as he is, sees it and keeps going to church 
though secretly in despair about the whole matter, or sees it, 
quits going to church, but can't find the time to look around for 
his soul. The pseudonymous authors make it evident that living 
within this boring order of moments is not peculiar to any one 
type of man. It includes the fragmented personality, the ex­
perimental psychologist and the poet. Everyone stands in 
relation to the moment similarly. There is no temporal means 
of escaping the demands of time. The only means of overcoming 
boredom is in overcoming time. Who even cares about such a prob­
lem? For the few who care Kierkegaard develops the common word, 
the instant. Since man has always had time, since he has al­
ways lived in a finite world, if you take time away man is gone. 
But can't man overcome this time? "Yes," answers Kierkegaard, 
Time can be overcome and it is in the instant that Eternity 
breaks through into this time. Then the boredom of the momen­
tary experience is radically reduced to nothing and made over 
again into everything.
But then, one asks, on what occasion will this take place.
At what time can I count on converting a moment into an instant? 
Let me recollect, will it be on Hew Years, at next Sunday's 
worship service, at the completion of my education, at the
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"birth, of a child, when I choose a bride, when I purchase a house, 
when I take a joint, or when I convince myself of my righteous­
ness? Could it be that the occasion, as so well ordered by 
technological man, is incapable of ever allowing for the possi­
bility of the instant? Could it be that regardless of the 
sermon, the day, the country, the music, or the community that 
the occasion of itself cannot determine the instant?
And yet won't something so time-less as an instant cause a 
person to worry, see a psychiatrist or maybe even return as 
quickly as possible to a more temporary problem? But what if 
a person tried to allow the instant to happen, would he not 
fear and tremble in such a way that all the time bound theo­
retical constructs of psychology would grow pale and become 
silent. Is psychology ever silent? Does the quest for knowledge 
never cease? Can anyone but get on with his business of the day?
But suppose the instant occurs. Suppose Eternity breaks 
through into time. Wouldn't that too become boring? "No," 
answers Kierkegaard. For finite man the infinite is not boring. 
In this one case, when the finite and the infinite come to­
gether repetition is beautiful. It is only face to face with 
the infinite that man blossoms into full manhood and realizes 
his freedom. Continually, however, the instant is hidden from 
view and the moment tempts one to return to its embrace. Only 
the possibility of repeating the eternal in time can give man 
hope to abandon oneself absurdly to the instant. To expect 
the future to be filled with more and more moments of pleasure 
is not the expectation of one who lives in the instant.
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Repetition of the infinite has taken the future out of the 
hands of time-bound moments and let the future come to rest 
in the instant. The moment by moment meastiring out of exist­
ence has been overcome.
And yet isn't Kierkegaard's writing itself going to be 
sucked up into this moment by moment consumption of everything? 
Won't people start writing more either/or's about Either/Or?
Yes, they will and Kierkegaard no doubt expected it. For 
Kierkegaard offered to the mob-minded intellectuals his pseu­
donymous out-pourings, but not as the truth but as that necessary 
bit of flash which would deceitfully make it necessary for the 
individual reader to consider the possiblity of The Truth. Let 
the pseudonymous muses go on. Let distinctions be made ad in­
finitum within the un-existential categories of non-belief. To 
come away from the pseudonymous muses as a non-believing ex­
istentialist would have been an impossibility for Kierkegaard.
The only existentialist for Kierkegaard is the believer. The 
reader either finds momentary security in the pseudonymous 
patterns of thought (becomes an either/or) or he abandons 
pseudonymnity entirely and existentially becomes edified in 
the 'Word of God.
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